by the Commercial Arbitration Code (the “Code”), adopted by the
Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 17 (2nd. Supp.). The
Code is based on the Model Law. At issue was a request to correct
an obvious computational error of $500, in the context of an
award of over $1 million. As well, the requesting party had complied with the 30-day time period in which to seek a correction to
a computational error. Given those facts, that decision does not
assist the respondents in this case.
( ii) Second argument: The continuing jurisdiction of the
 The respondents further submit there was no error in the
application judge’s conclusion that the Award was not “binding”
in light of the September 18, 2016 and June 7, 2017 statements
from the tribunal indicating its willingness to consider further
claims by the parties.
 The tribunal’s first letter dealt largely with the issue of the
Award’s currency. As mentioned, that no longer is an issue.
 However, the beth din’s first letter also stated that the parties could contact the rabbinical court clerk if the parties had
“any other claims that the parties wish to be resolved”. The second letter purported to stay the Award until Mr. Popack returned
to the beth din for “a hearing to determine Lipszyc’s claim, that
Popack continuously breached the Arbitration Agreement, and
what are the consequences for breaching the Arbitration Agreement”. The application judge regarded those letters from the
arbitral tribunal as “an indication that the arbitration process the
parties committed to is not yet complete”: at para. 13.
 The application judge did not explain which provisions of
the Model Law or arbitration agreement led him to regard the
tribunal’s statements as supporting his conclusion that the
Award was not “binding”. Nevertheless, in my respectful view,
the application judge erred in law by conflating two distinct
issues: first, whether the Award was “binding” for purposes of
recognition or enforcement pursuant to the Model Law; and, second, whether the beth din had jurisdiction under the arbitration
agreement to accept new claims from a party following the issuance of the Award. The application judge seemed to reason that if
a party approached the arbitral tribunal with a request to consider a new issue some three years after the Award had issued, the
Award was not binding for purposes of the Model Law.
 With respect, the application judge fell into error by adopting such an approach. It ignored the operation of art. 32 of the
Model Law. Article 32(1) of the Model Law states, in part, that
“arbitral proceedings are terminated by the final award”. Article