32(3) provides that “[t]he mandate of the arbitral tribunal terminates with the termination of the arbitral proceedings, subject to
the provisions of articles 33 and 34(4)” — i.e., subject to a request
for a correction or interpretation of an award, an additional
award, or a suspension of setting aside proceedings by a court.
 As Born points out, at p. 3117, art. 32(1) and (3) of the
Model Law are subject only to “specific, carefully-defined excep-
tions for corrections and interpretation”:
[S]ave for the particular statutory authorizations contained in the Model Law
for corrections or interpretations of the award, a tribunal loses its capacity to
act in an arbitration after the final award has been made. Thus, under
the Model Law, the rule that an arbitral tribunal becomes “functus officio”
is expressly mandated, but with specified and carefully-delineated residual
(Italics in original; citations omitted)
 As noted, on its face the Award was framed as a final
award — the arbitral tribunal ordered the respondents to pay the
appellants “the sum of $400,000, whereby the parties are released
from each other”. In the Award, the beth din did not identify
any other matter that required determination in the arbitration
before the parties were “released from each other”.
 However, the respondents argue that costs were one such
matter. They contend that an arbitral tribunal possesses the
jurisdiction to issue cost awards and therefore their request for
costs relating to the Ontario court proceedings fell within the
continuing jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.
 As Casey notes, at p. 227: “The Model Law does not
address costs or scale of costs.” As Born points out, at pp. 3093-
95, most international arbitration institutional rules grant the
tribunal broad powers to award legal costs; even where they do
not, the arbitration agreement should be interpreted to grant
impliedly such authority.
 In the present case, the arbitration agreement does not
address the issue of costs. Even if the power to grant costs is to be
implied, no evidence was filed on the recognition application that
either party had asked the beth din to include costs in the Award.
Even if they had and the beth din simply overlooked that claim,
art. 33(1) and (3) required any such request to be made within
30-days of receipt of the Award. The respondents made no request in that period of time.
 The evidence is clear why the respondents did not. Their
request that the beth din consider a claim for court costs
incurred after the issuance of the Award does not involve a matter of correction or an additional award “as to claims presented
in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the award” within