Since Cooper, both reasonable foreseeability and proximity
— the latter expressed in Cooper as a distinct and more demanding hurdle than reasonable foreseeability — must be proven in
order to establish a prima facie duty of care. See Deloitte &
Touche v. Livent Inc. (Receiver of),  2 S.C.R. 855, 
S.C.J. No. 63, at para. 34.
 The Supreme Court in Rankin (Rankin’s Garage &
Sales) v. J. (J.),  S.C.J. No. 19, 2018 SCC 19 described the
rationale for the first two requirements as follows [at paras. 22
The rationale underlying this approach is self-evident. It would simply not
be just to impose liability in cases where there was no reason for defendants
to have contemplated that their conduct could result in the harm complained
of. Through the neighbour principle, the defendant, as creator of an unrea-
sonable risk, is connected to the plaintiff, the party whose endangerment
made the risk unreasonable: E. J. Weinrib, “The Disintegration of Duty”, in
M. S. Madden, ed., Exploring Tort Law (2005), 143, at p. 151. The wrongdo-
ing relates to the harm caused. Thus, foreseeability operates as the “funda-
mental moral glue of tort”, shaping the legal obligations we owe to one
another, and defining the boundaries of our individual liability: D. G. Owen,
“Figuring Foreseeability” (2009), 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1277, at p. 1278.
In addition to foreseeability of harm, proximity between the parties is also
required: Cooper, at para. 31. The proximity analysis determines whether the
parties are sufficiently “close and direct” such that the defendant is under
an obligation to be mindful of the plaintiff’s interests: Cooper, at para.
32; Hercules Managements Ltd. v. Ernst & Young,  2 S.C.R. 165,
at para. 24. This is what makes it just and fair to impose a duty: Cooper,
at para. 34. The proximity inquiry considers the “expectations, representations, reliance, and the property or other interests involved” as between the
parties: Cooper, at para. 34. In cases of personal injury, when there is no relationship between the parties, proximity will often (though not always) be
established solely on the basis of reasonable foreseeability: see Childs,
at para. 31.
 Assessing reasonable foreseeability entails asking whether
the injury to the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence (Cooper, at para. 30).
 The issue to be decided is whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Mr. Stewart would be injured (or more seriously
injured) as a result of not wearing a seat belt in the taxi cab.
I. Nonfeasance vs. misfeasance
 There is an important distinction to be drawn based on
whether a duty of care alleged negligent act is “nonfeasance” or
 As stated by the Supreme Court in Childs [at paras. 31,
34, 35, 36, 37 and 38]: