[126] There is no evidence of reasonable reliance by Mr. Stewart. Can reasonable reliance be inferred in these circumstances?
In my view, no.
[127] Reasonable reliance cannot be inferred in this case
because the dangerous situation was not caused or contributed to
by Yaxley. At the heart of this case, the dangerous situation was
created by Mr. Stewart by his voluntary intoxication. Mr. Stewart
put himself at risk of injury in the event of an accident.
[128] Reliance that the taxi driver will ensure the intoxicated
adult passenger will be and remain seat belted during the fare
cannot be inferred simply because an intoxicated adult hires
a taxi cab late at night at a bar. What can be reasonably inferred
is that the taxi driver will drive safely and the taxi cab is a safe
vehicle. This would include having seat belts available for the
adult passenger’s use, if the adult passenger so chooses.
[129] As stated above, the law obligates all adult passengers to
buckle their seat belt in a vehicle. Absent evidence which demonstrates reliance by the intoxicated adult passenger and a representation of acceptance of that responsibility by the taxi cab
driver (explicitly or implicitly), the obligation and responsibility
on an adult passenger to buckle his seat belt cannot justifiably
and unilaterally be imposed on the taxi driver.
[130] The question becomes even more specific. Is there any
evidence that Mr. Stewart reasonably relied on Mr. Yaxley to
ensure he remained buckled during the fare? The simple answer
is no.
[131] In any event, the facts demonstrate that Mr. Stewart did
not rely on Mr. Yaxley to buckle his seat belt. He buckled the seat
belt himself.
[132] I do not find there is evidence of any reasonable reliance
by Mr. Stewart, explicitly or implicitly, that Mr. Yaxley would take
steps to guard Mr. Stewart’s safety by ensuring he buckled his
seat belt and remained buckled during the fare.
IV. Adult passenger’s autonomy
[133] An adult passenger’s autonomy is a factor to be consid-
ered in determining whether there is a proximate relationship.
The Supreme Court described this in Childs [at para. 39]:
Also running through the examples is a concern for the autonomy of the
persons affected by the positive action proposed. The law does not impose
a duty to eliminate risk. It accepts that competent people have the right to
engage in risky activities. Conversely, it permits third parties witnessing
risk to decide not to become rescuers or otherwise intervene. It is only
when these third parties have a special relationship to the person in danger
or a material role in the creation or management of the risk that the law
may impinge on autonomy. Thus, the operator of a risky sporting activity
