Adults can self-induce intoxication. They can make
a choice to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication. It is obvious that persons who choose to become intoxicated,
as in this case, will be less able to care for themselves, make
appropriate choices, or make safe decisions to protect them from
harm when intoxicated. If an adult chooses to become intoxicated
to the point that the adult cannot protect their own safety or
carry out their responsibility in a taxi cab to buckle their seat
belt, there is little reason why the law should find a duty and
impose an obligation on a taxi cab driver to assume the responsibility and liability for the voluntarily intoxicated adult.
 I see no valid policy reason why this “transfer” of respon-sibility/liability should occur arising solely from the hiring of
a taxi cab. There is no obvious societal benefit for this transfer
of responsibility arising solely from the hiring of a taxi cab by
an intoxicated adult passenger.
III. A remedy already exists for the injuries suffered
by Mr. Stewart
 An adult passenger, regardless of whether he is intoxicated, has a remedy against a driver and owner of the vehicle who
negligently causes a MVA.
 This remedy is not illusory. The law provides that all
drivers and owners of vehicles must be insured. Further, as an
additional safeguard, the law also provides for remedies for
injured persons where the negligent motorist is uninsured. See,
generally, the Ontario Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8.
 There are extensive rules of the road designed to prevent
accidents. See, generally, the Highway Traffic Act. Accidents generally do not occur absent a breach of the rules of the road or negligence. Liability and remedy can be visited upon the negligent
driver and owner.
 As a result, existing law already provides a remedy to an
adult passenger — a cause of action for those which are responsible through negligence for the MVA.
IV. No moral wrong committed by a taxi driver
 The law of negligence is intended to impose obligations
on those persons where there is a general public sentiment for
moral wrongdoing against the defendant. As stated, at para. 10
Lord Atkin recognized this problem in Donoghue v. Stevenson. He accepted
that negligence is based on a “general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing
for which the offender must pay”, but distinguished legal duties from moral
obligation: “. . . acts or omissions which any moral code would censure cannot