which was then in force. Unaware of the dismissal order but prior
to the expiry of the 45 days, the appellants’ lawyer tried to note the
respondents in default but was precluded from doing so due to the
dismissal. The lawyer failed to inform his clients of the dismissal
and only reported the matter to LawPRO over two years later in
December 2013. In that time period, he unsuccessfully made some
efforts to negotiate a setting aside of the dismissal order.
 Ultimately, the appellants served a notice of motion to set
aside the dismissal in February 2014. As such, the total time
between the date of the dismissal order (August 25, 2011) and the
bringing of the motion to set aside the dismissal order (February
20, 2014) was two years and six months.
 Economical Insurance Company (“Economical”) insures the
vehicle the appellants were [in] at the time of the accident. If the
dismissal is set aside, the appellants intend to bring a motion to
add Economical to the action in order to access the uninsured
motorist provisions of its policy. Economical was granted intervenor status because it was the uninsured motorist carrier for the
appellants and an ultimate target for recovery.
 Master Hawkins heard the motion in June and September
2015 and overturned the registrar’s administrative dismissal on
December 11, 2015 [Prescott v. Barbon,  O.J. No. 6543, 2015
ONSC 7689 (S.C.J.)].
 The respondents appealed the master’s decision. The Superior Court judge (the “SCJ”) allowed the appeal and overturned
the master’s decision, thus reinstating the administrative dismissal. She ordered the appellants to pay costs of $8,370 to each of
the respondents and did not disturb the master’s costs order of
$3,000 to be paid by the appellants to each of them.
 The appellants appeal from that decision and the respondents seek leave to appeal the SCJ’s costs award. For the following
reasons, I would dismiss both the appeal and the request for leave
to appeal costs.
 The SCJ anchored her decision overturning the master’s
order on three components of the master’s reasons:
— he erred in failing to consider the entire statutory scheme relat-
ing to administrative dismissals in his contextual analysis;
— he erred in finding the respondents partially responsible for
the administrative dismissal; and
— he erred in his approach to the factors set out in Reid v. Dow
Corning Corp.,  O.J. No. 2365, 11 C.P.C. (5th) 80
(S.C.J.), with emphasis on his failure to consider the principle
of finality in his prejudice analysis.