the court to make the order that is just and that the court should
consider and weigh all relevant factors to determine the order
that is just in the circumstances of the particular case. The master noted that a contextual approach was mandated by this court
in Scaini and, quoting from this court in H.B. Fuller Co. v. Rogers
(c.o.b. Rogers Law Office),  O.J. No. 1260, 2015 ONCA 173,
330 O.A.C. 378, identified the tension between deciding actions on
their merits and resolving actions in a timely and efficient manner to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.
 The master then described the changes to rules 48.14 and
48.15 and the statutory scheme. At para. 19, he noted that “what
now constitutes an acceptable level of diligence in the prosecution
of an action is a much easier test to meet than was the case in
the past.” He stated [at para. 21] that the repeal of rule 48.15
“may . . . be considered as part of the context in which this
motion to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing an action as
abandoned was argued”.
 This was in error. Rule 48.15 was in force when the registrar
dismissed the action as abandoned, but by the time the motion was
argued, it had been repealed. As such, it could not form part of the
applicable context, and it was an error for the master to make this
statement. He went on to say [at para. 35]: “[O]wing to the
amendments to rule 48.14, I do not find this delay to be inordinate.” For the same reason, this too was in error.
II. Primary responsibility for action’s progress lies with
 The master then considered the four criteria contained in
Reid. Dealing with the first criterion, he did not find the lawyer’s
explanation for the delays to be satisfactory. However, he also
observed that the respondents had to accept part of the blame for
the dismissal. The SCJ took issue with this finding. She stated
that the party who commences the proceeding bears the primary
responsibility for its progress, and the master erred in law in concluding that the respondents were at fault for not filing a defence.
She said that the rule governing administrative dismissals places
no obligation on defendants to file a defence to prevent a registrar’s dismissal, and as such, the master’s approach in treating
the respondents as blameworthy created a categorization that
does not exist under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
 I agree with the SCJ’s conclusion. There is no burden on the
defendant to explain the delay or to move the action to trial:
Wellwood, at paras. 37-41, 84; Jadid v. Toronto Transit Commission,
 O.J. No. 6474, 2016 ONCA 936, at para. 23. The primary
responsibility for the progress of an action lies with the plaintiff: