MDM Plastics Ltd. v. Vincor International Inc. (2015), 124 O.R.
(3d) 420,  O.J. No. 265, 2015 ONCA 28, at para. 33. As Cronk
J.A. stated in Wellwood, at para. 48, “the initiating litigant generally suffers the consequences of a dilatory regard for the pace of
the litigation”. Although there may be occasions where the defendant’s conduct may be relevant (see, for example, Labelle v. Canada
Border Services Agency,  O.J. No. 1166, 2016 ONCA 187;
Aguas v. Rivard Estate (2011), 107 O.R. (3d) 142,  O.J. No.
3108, 2011 ONCA 494; and Armstrong v. McCall,  O.J. No.
2055, 213 O.A.C. 229 (C.A.), at para. 26), assigning fault that arises
from a failure to file a notice of intent to defend or a statement of
defence within the context of Rule 48 was misplaced.
 There was also a more fundamental problem embedded in
the master’s consideration of the first and second criteria of the
Reid test. There was no evidence filed from either of the appellants:
no sworn affidavit, no correspondence, no testimony under oath.
There was simply a bald statement from the lawyer that it had
always been the intention of the appellants to proceed with the
action. This was inadequate particularly given that, as noted by the
SCJ, there was no reference to any conversations with the respondents, no evidence of any contact with any of the respondents
between January 3, 2012 and February 2014, and only minimal
contact before that time. There was no evidence that any of the
respondents had asked about the status of their action in over two
years. The master’s finding that the respondents intended to prosecute their claim was unreasonable in light of the full factual context.
 The SCJ focused particularly on the master’s failure to
consider the finality principle in his analysis of prejudice. In that
regard, she relied on H.B. Fuller Co. and Marché.
 Prejudice is a key consideration on a motion to set aside
a dismissal order: Finlay v. Van Paassen (2010), 101 O.R. (3d)
390,  O.J. No. 1097, 2010 ONCA 204, at para. 28.
 In addressing this issue, it is important to consider the
different aspects of prejudice. In Reid, the focus is on whether
a defendant would suffer “any significant prejudice in presenting
their case at trial” (para. 41). The emphasis described in that
decision is on the impact of delay on a defendant’s ability to
mount a defence to the plaintiff’s claim.
 However, in Marché, Sharpe J.A. identified an additional
dimension to the fourth Reid factor: security of legal position and
finality [at paras. 36, 38 and 40]:
[A]s the Master correctly observed, the jurisprudence from this court identi-
fies as relevant to the fourth Reid factor the security of legal position gained