by a litigant through a court order granted because of delay or default: see
Halton Community Credit Union Ltd. v. ICL Computers Canada Ltd., supra.
. . . . .
Even when the order dismissing the action was made for delay or default and
not on the merits, and even when the party relying on the order could still
defend itself despite the delay, it seems to me that at some point the interest
in finality must trump the opposite party’s plea for an indulgence.
. . . . .
I agree with the Master that, when viewed in the light of a delay of this
magnitude, the security of the legal position obtained by the appellant
becomes an important factor to consider. Five years after the action against it
had been dismissed, the appellant was entitled to rest on the assurance that
the judicial system had disposed of the respondents’ claim once and for all.
 As such, in considering the fourth Reid factor, the master
was required to address
( i) did the appellants satisfy their onus to establish no signifi-
cant actual prejudice to the respondents’ ability to defend the
action as a result of the appellants’ delay; and
( ii) whether in light of the delay, the principle of finality and the
respondents’ reliance on the security of its position should
nevertheless prevail. See H.B. Fuller, at para. 28.
 There is no need to resort to presumptions or inferences of
prejudice. The question as described by Sharpe J.A. in Marché is
simply whether the interest in finality must trump the opposite
party’s pleas for an indulgence.
 The SCJ acknowledged in her reasons that the master
addressed the issue of prejudice but maintained that the master
erred in failing to consider the finality principle. I agree with this
 The master did address whether either of the respondents
had suffered any significant prejudice in presenting his case at trial
as a result of the appellants’ delay or as a result of steps taken following the dismissal of the action and properly placed the onus on
the appellants to establish that the respondents had not suffered
prejudice. However, he did not consider the finality principle.
 Coupling this failure with the master’s consideration of the
incorrect context, the blame allocated to the respondents, and the
absence of any evidence from the appellants, the SCJ was correct
in setting aside his decision and considering the merits of the
motion anew. Her conclusion is effectively captured, in para. 51 of
More than eight years ago, the plaintiffs were involved in a minor car acci-
dent; all three vehicles drove away from the accident. The lawyer issued