fashion as a court challenge to set aside an award. Therefore, it
was reasonable for the application judge to conclude the award
was not yet binding because the tribunal had not yet determined
whether it had fully adjudicated all issues.
V. Standard of Review
 The interpretation of a statute, such as the ICAA and its
schedules, involves a question of law reviewable on a correctness
standard: Housen v. Nikolaisen,  2 S.C.R. 235,  S.C.J.
No. 31, 2002 SCC 33, at para. 8; and Wilk v. Arbour (2017),
135 O.R. (3d) 708,  O.J. No. 164, 2017 ONCA 21, at para. 18.
Deference, however, is shown to a court’s determination
of mixed questions of fact and law, such as the application of the
statute to the circumstances of the case or the interpretation of
an arbitration agreement: 6524443 Canada Inc. v. Toronto (City),
 O.J. No. 3045, 2017 ONCA 486, 415 D.L.R. (4th) 475, at
 The respondents contend that deference is owed to the
application judge’s interpretation of the ICAA and its schedules,
including the Model Law. They point out that in its endorsement
in 6524443 Canada this court stated, at para. 11, that the reasonableness standard applied to the motion judge’s interpretation of
an arbitration agreement because her “interpretation involved,
as an integral part of the interpretation process, consideration of
the meaning of the provisions of the relevant arbitration statutes.
This was not however an ‘extricable’ legal issue, that would be
reviewable on a standard of correctness.”
 I read the endorsement in 6524443 Canada in a different
way. This court’s statement was directed to the specific circum-
stances of that case, which did not call for an interpretation of
the applicable domestic arbitration legislation but turned on the
interpretation of the language of the particular arbitration
 By contrast, the present case is concerned with the interpretation of the recognition and enforcement provisions of the
Model Law, in conjunction with the provisions of the Model Law
concerning the termination of proceedings (art. 32) and the correction of awards (art. 33). These are issues with a high degree of
generality, having implications beyond the parties and their specific arbitration agreement. Consequently, they are questions of
law and the correctness standard applies: Sattva Capital Corp. v.
Creston Moly Corp.,  2 S.C.R. 633,  S.C.J. No. 53,
2014 SCC 53, at para. 51. As this court recently stated, the standard of review applicable to the “interpretation of the Model
Law and ICAA, as an issue of law”, is correctness: Trade Finance