other words, if you conclude that Ms. Mascia is not credible, you cannot use
that finding to conclude that Maria Figliola is guilty.
 The appellant does not take issue with the determination
that Ms. Mascia was an adverse witness. She contends, however,
that the trial judge improperly exercised his discretion in allowing
the Crown to cross-examine Ms. Mascia. The appellant maintains
that the probative value/prejudicial effect analysis strongly
favoured prohibiting cross-examination.
 In support of this position, the appellant argues that the
Crown was not taken by surprise by Ms. Mascia’s testimony. The
Crown knew that Ms. Mascia would give evidence inconsistent
with prior statements and in conflict with evidence given by
Latorre. The Crown also had no reason to think that Ms. Mascia
would adopt any of her prior statements as true, thereby making
them substantive evidence in the case.
 As I understand the thrust of this submission, the appellant contends that cross-examination under s. 9(1) of Crown witnesses is limited to situations in which the inconsistent evidence
is unexpected and/or there is some real likelihood that cross-examination will cause the witness to adopt the earlier inconsistent statement.
 The law is firmly against this submission: see Dooley,
at para. 161. The Crown on the retrial was in no different position
than the Crown in Figliola #1. At the first trial, the Crown knew
full well that Ms. Mascia would give evidence inconsistent with
prior statements and that she was unlikely to provide helpful evidence for the Crown in respect of some issues. In Figliola #1, the
court did not suggest that the Crown should not have been allowed
to cross-examine Ms. Mascia because it knew she would give evidence inconsistent with her statements, or because there was no
real prospect that she would adopt her earlier statements. To the
contrary, the court implicitly accepted that she was properly cross-examined on those statements. The court’s concern was that
the cross-examination went well beyond the limits of s. 9(1). The
appellant’s submission would unduly limit the scope of cross-examination permitted under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act
and is contrary to the holding in Figliola #1.
 The appellant next submits that Ms. Mascia’s evidence
was, by the time the Crown called her, of little importance to the
Crown’s case. The appellant also contends that defence counsel’s
offer at trial to present Ms. Mascia’s evidence by way of an agreed
statement of facts further diminished the evidentiary value of
her testimony for the Crown. In effect, the appellant contends
that Ms. Mascia’s testimony had so little probative value
to the Crown’s case that any cross-examination on statements