In connection with this ground of appeal, the appellant argues
that the trial judge failed to consider some evidence and misapprehended other relevant evidence.
 We do not accept these submissions for the following
 First, the appellant mischaracterizes the test for undue
influence in the context of testamentary gifts. The rebuttable
presumption of undue influence arises only in the context of inter
vivos transactions that take place during the grantor’s lifetime.
It arises from particular relationships when the validity of inter
vivos dispositions or transactions is in issue; once the presumption is established, the onus shifts to the transferee to rebut the
presumption: Banton v. Banton,  O.J. No. 3528, 164 D.L.R.
(4th) 176 (Gen. Div.), at p. 209 D.L.R.
 In the case of wills, it is testamentary undue influence,
amounting to outright and overpowering coercion of the testator,
which must be considered. The party attacking the will bears the
onus of proving undue influence on a balance of probabilities:
Vout v. Hay,  2 S.C.R. 876,  S.C.J. No. 58, at p. 887
S.C.R.; see, also, Neuberger v. York (2016), 129 O.R. (3d) 721,
 O.J. No. 1164, 2016 ONCA 191, at paras. 77-78.
 We agree that the trial judge erred in his articulation of
the test for undue influence applicable to testamentary gifts.
When determining the validity of Mr. Paterson’s March 11, 2011
will, the trial judge appears to have erroneously conflated the test
for undue influence that applies to inter vivos transfers with the
relevant test in relation to testamentary gifts.
 In our view, this error did not affect the reasonableness of
his conclusions that the respondent exercised no undue influence
over Mr. Paterson, and that Mr. Paterson independently decided
to make the impugned wills and the transfer of property in favour
of the respondent.
 The trial judge’s finding that there was no undue influence
using the inter vivos standard would necessarily be the same had
the trial judge applied the correct standard applicable to testamentary dispositions.
 Under either test, the trial judge was required to examine
all of the relevant surrounding circumstances. As a result, the
trial judge’s decision turned on his findings of fact which were
firmly rooted in the evidence before him. This included the medical and lay evidence of Mr. Paterson’s state of mind and overall
health; the nature and length of his relationships with the
respondent and his children; and his instructions to his solicitors,
which indicated that he had thought deeply and thoroughly about
the disposition of his property.