are also access to justice concerns arising from the deterrent
effect that allowing questions about deeply personal matters can
have on the readiness of victims to report sexual offences. And
there are compelling concerns, particularly acute in jury trials,
that such questioning can feed rape myths, potentially distorting
the outcomes of cases.
 Notwithstanding these powerful considerations, there are
times when such questioning must be permitted. When applied
properly, s. 276 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 strikes
the balance. This is one of those cases where a proper balancing
under s. 276 requires that such questioning be permitted.
 Here, the Crown claimed that the complainant’s pregnancy
corroborated her sexual assault allegation. The implication being
that only the accused, R.V., could be the father. Yet the application
judge1 refused to allow R.V. to attempt to challenge that proposition when cross-examining the complainant, a witness who would
clearly be able to answer those questions. That decision was
 A second error occurred after the application judge who
made the s. 276 ruling was unable to continue with the trial.
When the trial judge took over the trial pursuant to s. 669.2, he
held that he could not reconsider the application judge’s s. 276
ruling, because s. 669.2 judges are bound by rulings made by the
judge they replace. That is not so. As I will explain, in the particular circumstances of this case, this error mattered.
 I would therefore allow R.V.’s conviction appeal and order
a new trial.
 There are two general issues in this appeal that warrant
consideration. The first issue also raises several sub-issues that
must be addressed:
(A) Did the application judge err in refusing to permit R.V. to con-
duct any cross-examination of the complainant about sexual
activity that does not form the subject matter of the charge?
(1) Is there a fixed rule requiring cross-examination or other
evidence tending to prove that a person other than the
1 For reasons I will explain, two judges participated in R.V.’s trial. The first
judge heard and ruled on the initial s. 276 application but was subsequently
unable to continue with the trial. A second judge took over. To avoid confusion between the two judges, I will refer to the first judge as the “
application judge” and the second as the “trial judge”.