‘to explain the physical conditions on which the Crown relies to
establish intercourse . . . such as pregnancy’.” I disagree. Seaboyer
does not go this far.
 In Seaboyer, a majority of the court struck down prior rape
shield legislation because it attempted to predefine, with fixed
rules, when prior sexual experience evidence would be probative
enough to be admissible. The majority held that the problem in
approaching the admissibility issue in such a way was that relevance, probative value and prejudice in all of its forms are fact-specific considerations that vary depending on the circumstances
of the case. This makes it perilous to attempt fixed rules. I agree
with the Crown that Seaboyer cannot be read as erecting the
same kind of fixed admissibility regime that it struck down.
 The wisdom in avoiding fixed rules is easy to demonstrate.
For example, if there had been DNA evidence confirming that
R.V. was not the one who impregnated the complainant, evidence
about the complainant’s other sexual experiences would add
nothing of value. A fixed rule permitting such questioning would
create needless prejudice.
 Moreover, it is clear from the passages that R.V. relied
upon that Seaboyer was not attempting to set down a fixed rule.
The passage from Seaboyer partially quoted in the passage from
R.V.’s factum I reproduced above actually says that such evidence
“may be relevant to explain the physical conditions” (emphasis
added): at p. 614 S.C.R. Before listing “[e]vidence of specific
instances of sexual conduct tending to prove that a person other
than the accused caused the physical consequences of the rape
alleged by the prosecution” as an example of admissible evidence,
McLachlin J. (as she then was) prefaced that and the other
examples she was about to give, saying “evidence of consensual
sexual conduct on the part of the complainant may be admissible”
(emphasis added) where its probative value is not substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect: at p. 635 S.C.R.
 There is no fixed rule allowing accused persons to prove
that the complainant’s other sexual activities may have caused
a physical condition the Crown relies upon to confirm an alleged
offence. Seaboyer does, however, affirm that such cases exemplify
situations where the proof of other sexual activity may well be
important enough to admit, a point I will return to below.
(2) Does the “specific instances of sexual activity” requirement preclude R.V.’s application?
 The application judge decided that R.V.’s s. 276 application
should be dismissed because it was not capable of meeting the
test set out in s. 276(2). The application judge offered two reasons