It is clear from the trial Crown’s submissions made during
the three s. 276 application appearances that he was well aware
that R.V. wanted to cross-examine the complainant about
instances where she may have had other sexual experiences that
could have caused the pregnancy. The Crown was well positioned
to participate in the s. 276 application and safeguard the complainant’s interest. It had adequate information in order to consult the complainant beforehand, and to make admissibility
arguments during the s. 276 application.
 The application judge also had sufficient information to
determine the admissibility of R.V.’s evidence.
 She showed no insecurity in evaluating the risks of prejudice, which she did in some detail. She also had sufficient information to recognize that “the defence does not intend such
evidence to further the twin myths that, a) other sexual activity
makes the accused more likely to have consented or, b) that the
sexual activity makes her less worthy of belief”. Her reservation
related to the evaluation of the probative value of the evidence
was because she considered that “the probative value of the proposed questions [was] at best speculative”.
 I am persuaded that the probative value of the proposed
cross-examination was not, in fact, speculative. If the cross-examination disclosed other potential causes for the complainant’s pregnancy, the impact would be significant, for it would
entirely neutralize the Crown’s attempt to claim that the pregnancy corroborated the sexual assault allegation. On the other
hand, if the cross-examination failed to disclose other potential
causes for the complainant’s pregnancy, then the complainant’s
answers would assist the Crown’s theory.
 The probative value of the line of questioning itself was
not speculative. What was speculative was whether R.V.’s cross-examination of the complainant would succeed in securing the
evidence he sought. However, uncertainty of result does not
deprive a line of questioning of its probative value. In my view,
when considering probative value, the application judge’s focus
was wrong. She erred by effectively inquiring whether there was
a foundation for concluding that the cross-examination would
succeed in exposing other potential causes of the complainant’s
pregnancy, instead of whether the line of cross-examination itself
had probative value.
 In sum, the “specific instances of sexual activity” requirement in s. 276(2)(a) does not require accused persons to present
the particularized foundation the application judge insisted upon.
It requires that the proposed evidence or cross-examination must
be adequately identified to enable the admissibility of the