The complainant’s position going into the trial was that
she remained a virgin even though R.V. impregnated her. In her
taped police interview, the complainant said that she lost her vir-
ginity when she had sex with her boyfriend on September 2,
2013, two months after the alleged sexual assault. She said that
we all know when you lose your virginity you have like blood spottings and
it’s actually painful and that was actually what happened with me that day
when I I had when I was having sex with my boyfriend but when when it
happened with [R.V.] like I didn’t it wasn’t it like it wasn’t painful and like I
 During the s. 276 application, the trial Crown’s main sub-
mission was that R.V. did not have to ask the complainant about
her other sexual experiences to respond to the Crown’s claim that
he was the father. Citing decisions that hold that virginity is
a status and not a sexual experience, the trial Crown suggested
that R.V. could rest content to cross-examine the complainant on
her claim that she was a virgin at the time of the alleged assault.
 The application judge took up this suggestion. She held
that R.V. did not need to ask the complainant about her sexual
experiences because he could challenge the complainant’s paternity claim by using the medical evidence of the gestational age of
the foetus (a point I will return to), and by “cross-examination of
the complainant as to whether she was truthful in her statement
that she was a virgin and further what her understanding is of
the term ‘virgin’”.
 In my view, the cross-examination envisaged by the application judge was not a meaningful substitute for the cross-examination R.V. sought. The invitation to ask the complainant
whether she was telling the truth about her virginity was a pointless exercise. Cross-examination involves posing questions that
challenge the testimony that has been given. Asking a witness
whether they are telling the truth in making a claim is effectively
no cross-examination at all.
 Asking a complainant only about her understanding of the
term “virgin” is equally pointless. Exposing the complainant’s
apparent confusion about the meaning of virginity would get R.V.
nowhere unless he could go on to ask the complainant whether
she engaged in any other sexual activity capable of impregnating
her while maintaining her understanding of virginity.
 Indeed, in my view the entire premise that R.V. could
cross-examine the complainant about her claim to virginity without a s. 276 ruling was wrong in law. This kind of cross-examination is not an alternative to a s. 276 application. Rather,
it requires a successful s. 276 application.