offered in an attempt to rebut the kind of claim the Crown made
in this case is the paradigm example of where sexual experience
evidence is apt to be so important that it is likely to be admissible.
An accused person, met with the allegation that the complainant’s pregnancy confirms his crime because he is the only person
who could have caused that pregnancy, has a compelling claim to
be permitted to confront that allegation by cross-examining the
complainant. That compelling claim rests solidly in the right to
make full answer and defence, and in the interests of justice in
a fair process and a just determination.
 Moreover, the probative value of the proposed cross-examination in the case does not depend on discriminatory beliefs
or biases. And, contrary to the views expressed by the application
judge, this was not a case where the evidence “would seem more
likely to distort the truth seeking process at the trial than to further
it”. This was a judge-alone trial where the trial judge would presumably understand the proper use to which the cross-examination
evidence could be put. Trial judges would also be in a position,
through legal training and judicial experience, to caution themselves to avoid the risks of discriminatory beliefs or biases.
 However, there is weight on the other side of the scale as
well. I do not agree with R.V. that the cross-examination would
not significantly intrude on the dignity or privacy of the complainant. The prejudice to the personal dignity and privacy rights
of complainants whenever they are cross-examined in an effort to
show that they had other sexual experiences is not to be discounted. Such prejudice is real, particularly for someone as young
as this complainant. Whenever this kind of questioning is permitted, there is a risk that other complainants will be discouraged.
 Still, the risk of prejudice to both the complainant and the
larger administration of justice in this case does not substantially
outweigh the significant probative value of the proposed cross-examination. The urgency of vetting the Crown’s paternity allegation during trial was simply too great, and there was nothing in
the circumstances of this case to diminish it. Meanwhile, the
prejudice to the administration of justice of permitting the cross-examination, although real, was not intense enough to overcome
that need. The proposed cross-examination had to be permitted
under s. 276, and the application judge erred in failing to do so.
(4) Did this error cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice?
 Despite the application judge’s ruling, counsel for R.V.
managed to suggest to the complainant that she was not a virgin
when the alleged sexual assault occurred. He did so under the