guise of cross-examining her about her claimed virginity. This
question violated the application judge’s ruling and should not
have been asked.
 The complainant also provided extensive evidence, both in
her evidence-in-chief and during cross-examination, about her
understanding of virginity, the physiology and function of the
hymen, and what intercourse entails.
 The Crown relies upon all of this testimony to suggest that
R.V. effectively managed to conduct the cross-examination he
sought. It says that even if the application judge erred in her ruling, no miscarriage of justice occurred.
 I disagree. While counsel for R.V. did skirt the ruling by
indirectly suggesting to the complainant that she was not a virgin
when the alleged sexual assault occurred, he was not able to
probe her answer, or ask her about any particular sexual experiences she may have had that were capable of impregnating her
during the relevant period. What occurred was not a fair substitute for the cross-examination that should have been allowed. In
my view, a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.
B. Did the s. 669.2 trial judge err in holding that the application judge’s s. 276 ruling was binding on him?
 After the application judge was unable to continue, R.V.
immediately renewed his s. 276 application before the s. 669.2
trial judge. The application document R.V. filed was the same, and
none of the supporting facts had changed.
 The trial judge refused to re-open the s. 276 ruling. He
said: “My finding is the ruling . . . on the 276 application shall
stand and the defence is not entitled to re-litigate it.” He offered
alternative reasons for his decision.
 His main reason for refusing to entertain the application
was that s. 669.2 does not confer discretion on a s. 669.2 trial
judge to permit relitigation of matters settled by the judge who
was unable to continue. He expressed his conclusion on the effect
of s. 669.2 as follows: “I find that [the application judge’s] section
276 ruling . . . is binding, and the matter will not be re-heard.”
 He said, in the alternative:
In any event, even if I had the discretion to re-hear the 276 application,
I would decline to do so. The application was fully argued and dismissed at
a time that was several months before the issue that gave rise to the [applica-
tion judge’s departure] arose. The material filed on the 276 application now is
the same as it was before [the application judge]. The evidence is the same,
the arguments would be the same, and there is no change in circumstances
that might prompt a re-hearing.