I take no issue with the trial judge’s alternative ruling. In
my view, however, his conclusion that the application judge’s decision was binding on him was wrong in law.
 It is unnecessary in coming to this conclusion to revisit the
entirety of the clear and impressive statutory construction
analysis undertaken by the trial judge. The jurisdiction of
a s. 669.2 trial judge to reconsider prior rulings derives not from
s. 669.2, but from that judge’s status as the trial judge. When
a judge becomes seized of a matter under s. 669.2, he becomes the
trial judge for all purposes. Since he continues the trial as the
trial judge, the s. 669.2 trial judge is given the same authority
that the replaced trial judge had. As such, he has the same power
to reconsider prior rulings made within that trial by the replaced
trial judge, when it is in the interests of justice to do so.
 The power of a trial judge to reconsider earlier rulings
made within the trial they are presiding over is clear. The relevant principles are as follow.
 The principles of res judicata do not apply during a hear-
ing to decisions reached by a judge during that hearing, and
a judge is not functus officio when a voir dire has ended: R. v.
Farrah,  M.J. No. 200, 2011 MBCA 49, 268 Man. R. (2d)
112, at paras. 22-23. As Sopinka J. affirmed in R. v. Adams,
 4 S.C.R. 707,  S.C.J. No. 105, at para. 29, judges who
are not functus officio have jurisdiction to reconsider and vary the
orders that are made within a trial, in the interests of justice.
Justice Sopinka said, at para. 30:
As a general rule, any order relating to the conduct of a trial can be varied or
revoked if the circumstances that were present at the time the order was
made have materially changed. In order to be material, the change must
relate to a matter that justified the making of the order in the first place.
See, also, R. v. Calder,  1 S.C.R. 660,  S.C.J. No. 30, at
para. 21; R. v. La (appeal by Vu),  2 S.C.R. 680,  S.C.J.
No. 30, at para. 28; R. v. Morin (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 265,  O.J.
No. 217, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 54 (C.A.), at p. 60 D.L.R.; and R. v. B.
(H.),  O.J. No. 6567, 2016 ONCA 953, 345 C.C.C. (3d) 206,
at para. 51.
 Indeed, this court has held that a trial judge can change
their mind up until the point when the accused has been sentenced: R. v. Lessard,  O.J. No. 74, 30 C.C.C. (2d) 70 (C.A.).
 There are, of course, limits on the authority to reconsider.
It should not be used without circumspection because of the interest in finality and clarity. Nor can reconsideration produce unfairness: R. v. Montoute,  A.J. No. 74, 62 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (C.A.),