at p. 488 C.C.C.2 For example, it may not be appropriate to reconsider rulings that have been relied upon by one of the parties in
forming a trial strategy, unless the prejudice incurred in reliance on
the ruling can be remedied: R. v. Underwood,  1 S.C.R. 77,
 S.C.J. No. 107; R. v. MacDonald (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 417,
 O.J. No. 2606 (C.A.), per curiam; and R. v. Cole, 
3 S.C.R. 34,  S.C.J. No. 53, 2012 SCC 53, at paras. 99-104.
 The most common circumstance where it may be in the
interests of justice to reconsider rulings is where facts have materially changed: Adams, at para. 30; La (appeal by Vu), at para. 28;
R. v. Savojipour (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 418,  O.J. No. 469, 205
C.C.C. (3d) 533 (C.A.), at para. 15, per curiam; and R. v. Le, 
M.J. No. 319, 2011 MBCA 83, 270 Man. R. (2d) 82, at para. 123,
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused  S.C.C.A. No. 526.
 However, this is not the only circumstance. Rulings have
also been re-opened where a party has misunderstood the scope of
an admission, or because counsel was unaware of relevant evidence at the time: see the discussions summarized in R. v. C. (I.),
 O.J. No. 5, 2010 ONSC 32, 249 C.C.C. (3d) 510 (S.C.J.), at
paras. 151-63. A trial judge may also correct a decision that they
discover was made in error: R. v. Morgan,  A.J. No. 742,
29 Alta. L.R. (2d) 183 (Q.B.), at paras. 12 and 15; R. v. Williams,
 O.J. No. 2421, 2013 ONSC 3100, 300 C.C.C. (3d) 240
(S.C.J.); Setak Computer Services Corp. Ltd. v. Burroughs Business Machines Ltd. (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 750,  O.J. No. 2226,
76 D.L.R. (3d) 641 (H.C.J.), at p. 644 D.L.R.
 It would make no sense, in my view, for s. 669.2 trial judges
to be unable to respond in these ways in the interests of justice
because they are bound by decisions of the judge they have replaced.
 In my view, s. 669.2 does not impel such a conclusion. It is
true that s. 669.2 does not contain an express reconsideration
power similar to the one found in s. 653.1 relating to mistrials. The
primary function of s. 653.1, however, is to create a new rule that
enables pre-trial rulings that have been made in a mistried case to
apply at the new trial. This new rule was adopted in the interests
of efficiency, to preserve prior rulings where it is reasonable to do
so. Having provided for the continued application of pre-trial rulings, the section goes on to make clear that the inherent power of
2 Montoute was overruled on the separate issue of its interpretation of s. 8
of the Charter following R. v. Edwards (1996), 26 O.R. (3d) 736, 
1 S.C.R. 128,  S.C.J. No. 11 and R. v. Alcantara,  A.J. No. 883,
2015 ABCA 259, 606 A.R. 313, at para. 217.