trial judges to reconsider earlier decisions that I have described
above has not been removed. Section 653.1 provides:
653.1 In the case of a mistrial, unless the court is satisfied that it would not
be in the interests of justice, rulings relating to the disclosure or admissibility
of evidence or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that were made
during the trial are binding on the parties in any new trial if the rulings are
made — or could have been made — before the stage at which the evidence
on the merits is presented.
 Simply put, the inclusion in s. 653.1 of a discretionary
power to reconsider does not signal the exclusion of a power to
reconsider for trial judges acting under the authority of s. 669.2.
 Nor does reconsideration by the trial judge of a decision
made in the same proceeding or trial by another judge constitute
an impermissible collateral attack on the earlier decision: R. v.
Litchfield,  4 S.C.R. 333,  S.C.J. No. 127, at pp. 349-
50 S.C.R.; and R. v. Allen,  O.J. No. 3175, 110 C.C.C. (3d)
331 (C.A.), at pp. 343-44 C.C.C., per Doherty J.A.
 In my view, the trial judge therefore erred in concluding
that, as a s. 669.2 judge, he was bound by the application judge’s
s. 276 decision.
 Ordinarily this error would not matter because the trial
judge’s alternative, discretionary basis for refusing reconsideration was sound. At the time of the renewed s. 276 application,
there had been no change of circumstances or other reason to
revisit the prior ruling.
 Yet circumstances did later change in two material ways.
When this occurred, defence counsel did not ask to have the
s. 276 ruling re-opened. This is understandable. The trial judge’s
ruling that he was bound by the application judge’s s. 276 decision as a function of s. 669.2 made any such request futile. In my
view, a lawyer faced with the trial judge’s ruling that they lack
jurisdiction cannot fairly be expected to ask the trial judge to act
ultra vires because of a change in factual circumstances. Thus,
I am persuaded that the trial judge’s error resulted in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice by foreclosing subsequent
requests for reconsideration on the s. 276 decision in circumstances where reconsideration was due.
 The material change of circumstances that featured most
centrally in the parties’ submissions related to the estimated gestational age of the foetus on September 18, 2013 — being 13
weeks and five days.
 It is evident that during the s. 276 hearing, both defence
counsel and the application judge proceeded on the misunderstanding that the gestational age was calculated from the date of
conception, in this case producing a conception date of June 14,