by Dr. Montgomery and then by the complainant. Dr. Montgomery
explained how the pregnancy could not have occurred during the
“first ever sexual experience, or sexual active, sexual intercourse
. . . on the 2nd of September”, as described by the complainant.
 The complainant then provided evidence about this Sep-
tember 2, 2013 sexual experience during the Crown’s examination-
in-chief. The Crown asked her what she understood sexual inter-
course to mean. She described intercourse and testified that it
would cause pain and spotting for some women. He then asked her,
“Okay. And so, when you indicate that you’re asked that prior to
September 2nd, were you of the view that you had sexual inter-
course prior to that?” The complainant answered without linking
her answer to the testimony she had just given about pain and spot-
ting. The trial Crown then asked again, “Was it your understanding
if you had, based on the situation you had?” She replied, “I had told
[Dr. Montgomery] I wasn’t sure if it had happened or not on July
1st, but that I had hoped, and that I had thought it didn’t, because
of the spottings and pain I was in on September 2nd.”
 Unequivocally, this was testimony drawn by the Crown
from the complainant about sexual activity on an occasion other
than the alleged offence.
 I do not think I am being unfair in suggesting that the
Crown was seeking this testimony about her subsequent spotting
and pain during sexual intercourse with her boyfriend in an effort
to explain how the complainant persisted in her belief that she
was still a virgin despite her pregnancy. Regardless of whether
that is so, the fact that the Crown presented other sexual experience evidence as part of its case is material in a s. 276 application.
The Crown’s readiness to lead such evidence is relevant in weighing the prejudice that would be caused by defence questioning
about prior sexual experiences, and could properly have invited
an application to re-open the earlier s. 276 ruling.
 In my view, the trial judge’s erroneous conclusion that he
was bound by the application judge’s s. 276 ruling mattered. It
had the effect of rendering future meritorious applications to
reconsider futile. In my opinion, this is enough to require that
R.V.’s conviction be set aside.
 I would allow the appeal for the reasons provided, set
aside R.V.’s convictions and order a new trial.