[ 82] The judge was entitled to reject the appellant’s profession
of sorrow or remorse. While he erred in saying that the lack of
remorse was aggravating, the context in which the statement was
made indicates that the primary purpose was to emphasize the
appellant’s lack of insight into his crimes and the impact on his
risk of re-offending.
[ 83] In R. v. Shah,  O.J. No. 6141, 2017 ONCA 872, this
court observed that lack of remorse may indicate a lack of insight
and responsibility for the offence and may therefore be a relevant
factor in considering the risk of re-offending. The court stated,
at paras. 8-9:
Lack of remorse is not ordinarily a relevant aggravating factor on sentenc-
ing: R. v. Valentini  O.J. No. 251 (C.A.), at para. 82. It cannot be used to
punish the accused for failing to plead guilty or for having mounted
a defence: Valentini, at para. 83; R. v. J.F., 2011 ONCA 220, at para. 84,
105 O.R. (3d) 161; aff’d on other grounds in 2013 SCC 12,  1 S.C.R. 565.
Absence of remorse is a relevant factor in sentencing, however, with respect
to the issues of rehabilitation and specific deterrence, in that an accused’s
absence of remorse may indicate a lack of insight into and a failure to accept
responsibility for the crimes committed, and demonstrate a substantial
likelihood of future dangerousness: Valentini, at para. 82; R. v. B.P. (2004),
190 O.A.C. 354 (C.A.), at para. 2.
In the present case, the placement of the phrase concerning the appellant’s
lack of genuine remorse is awkward. However, when the Reasons for Sentence are considered in their entirety, we do not agree that the trial judge
treated the appellant’s lack of genuine remorse as an aggravating factor. Certainly, there is no indication that the trial judge increased the sentence
because the appellant lacked genuine remorse.
See, also, M. (L.), at para. 30.
[ 84] Taken in context, the trial judge did not use the appellant’s lack of remorse to increase the sentence. He properly used
it to assess the risk of re-offending and the consequent need to
isolate the appellant from society. If there was an error, it did not
have an impact on the sentence imposed.
Consecutive sentences for count 3 and count 7
[ 85] The appellant submitted that the sentencing judge erred
in imposing consecutive sentences for count 3 (possession of child
pornography) and count 7 (sexual interference). He submits that
the sexual interference was part and parcel of the possession of
child pornography and that the imposition of a six-month consecutive sentence for the possession count was unjustified.
[ 86] The appellant also submitted in his factum, relying on
R. v. Jewell, that the three-year sentence for sexual interference
was inappropriate because it was an inherent feature of the