who made brief submissions in support of the submissions made
by counsel for 274 Canada.
 Icona relies upon s. 61(1) of the CLPA as the authority for
the relief it seeks on this application. Subsection 61(1) of the
61(1) Where there is annexed to land a condition or covenant that the land or
a specified part of it is not to be built on or is to be or not to be used in a particular manner, or any other condition or covenant running with or capable of
being legally annexed to land, any such condition or covenant may be modified
or discharged by order of the Superior Court of Justice.
 The principles to be followed on an application for modification or discharge of a restrictive covenant pursuant to the
authority conferred by s. 61(1) of the CLPA were developed in
several decisions from the Court of Appeal, and they have been
applied in a number of subsequent decisions.
 In George (Re) (1926), 59 O.L.R. 574,  O.J. No. 72,
1926 CarswellOnt 144 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal interpreted the
1922 version of the CLPA. The 1922 version of the CLPA provided
that a restrictive covenant may be modified or discharged by
order of a judge “on proof to his satisfaction that the modification
will be beneficial to the persons principally concerned”. Those
words were eliminated at the time of the revision of the statutes
in 1927: Miller and Lawrie (Re),  O.J. No. 1441, 1978
CarswellOnt 2712 (H.C.J.), at para. 14.
 In George (Re), Middleton J.A. addressed the meaning of
the words “on proof to his satisfaction that the modification will
be beneficial to the persons principally concerned” that were
found in the 1922 version of the CLPA [at para. 13]:
The provisions of the statute (12 & 13 Geo V. ch. 53) are not easy to interpret.
A Judge is empowered to modify or discharge building restrictions “on proof to
his satisfaction that the modification will be beneficial to the persons principally
concerned.” If this means beneficial to the applicant the provision is senseless,
for the relief would not be sought unless the applicant deemed it a benefit. If it
means beneficial to the respondents it is again meaningless, for the respondents
would undoubtedly release any right they may have if for their benefit. The
meaning that has been given to the expression in practice is that the Judge
must satisfy himself that the balance of convenience is in favour of grant-
ing the application, having regard to the rights and interests of both
parties, and I think it may safely be said that the order should not be made
unless the benefit to the applicant greatly exceeds any possible detriment
to the respondents.