is the standard of review applied to the three-pronged assessment
conducted by a judge under s. 24(2) of the Charter. “Where a trial
judge has considered the proper factors and has not made any
unreasonable finding, his or her determination is owed considerable deference on appellate review. But where the relevant factors
have been overlooked or disregarded, a fresh Grant analysis is
both necessary and appropriate”: R. v. Cole,  3 S.C.R. 34,
 S.C.J. No. 53, 2012 SCC 53, at para. 82 (citations omitted).
See, also, Grant, at para. 86.
 As I understand the appellant’s submissions, he contends
that the trial judge ( i) failed to attach sufficient severity to the
s. 8 violations she found the police had committed, especially in
view of the appellant’s claim of solicitor-client privilege over
many of the seized materials; and ( ii) placed undue weight on her
findings that the police did not act in bad faith.
 I am not persuaded by the appellant’s submissions. The
trial judge considered the proper factors: she conducted an individual Grant assessment of each s. 8 violation and then applied
the Grant factors collectively to the infringements. She gave
detailed reasons for her findings.
 As her reasons disclose, the trial judge was alive to the fact
that some of the seized devices contained materials over which
solicitor-client privilege was asserted. She noted that ( i) the failure to seal six items involved devices over which no privilege was
claimed; ( ii) the failure to take notes involved those same devices;
and ( iii) no search of the seized items occurred during the period
prior to the filing of the s. 489.1(1) report or before the examination order was made. There is no suggestion in the record that
the police seizure of the devices or the subsequent review and
report by the examiner resulted in the disclosure of any privileged
information to the police or the Crown. As well, the appellant
acknowledges that the Crown did not seek to adduce any privileged information.
 The s. 24(2) findings made by the trial judge found ample
support in the evidence. None were unreasonable.
 Consequently, I see no basis for interfering with her conclusion to admit certain of the seized materials into evidence.
I would dismiss the appellant’s appeal from conviction.
III. The Sentence Appeal
A. The issue stated
 As noted, the appellant was sentenced to 45 days’ imprisonment, to be served intermittently on weekends, and three
years’ probation. Although the parties disagreed about the length