and contacting other adults for the purposes of planning and facilitating
criminal behaviour (K.R.J., at para. 107). With the broadened powers under
s. 161(1)(d), the court is better able to monitor offenders’ use of the Internet
thereby limiting their opportunities to offend and preventing such behaviour
(K.R.J., at para. 108).
 Given the discretionary nature of an order made under
s. 161(1), an appellate court should not interfere absent an error
in principle or the imposition of a prohibition that is demonstrably unfit and unreasonable in the circumstances: R. v. Q. (W.),
 O.J. No. 2491, 210 C.C.C. (3d) 398 (C.A.), at para. 25; and
Brar, at para. 26.
 The appellant submits the Internet limiting terms
imposed by the sentencing judge are unreasonable in that they
exceed the scope of the s. 161(1)(d) order imposed by this court in
Brar. That order restrained the offender from using the Internet
for 20 years to access ( i) any content that violated the law; and
( ii) any social media sites, social networks, Internet discussion
forums or chat rooms (or making a profile on any such service).
In fashioning that order, this court drew upon the decision of the
Quebec Court of Appeal in R. v. Perron,  J.Q. no. 2916, 2015
 In Perron, the Quebec Court of Appeal considered the reasonableness of a s. 161(1)(d) order in the context of convictions
for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching and luring.
Offences concerning child pornography were not involved. The
s. 161(1)(d) order imposed by the sentencing court prohibited use
of the Internet for five years except under the supervision of an
adult who was aware of the offences committed: at para. 35. On
appeal, the Crown submitted that instead of a total prohibition on
Internet use, the Court of Appeal should substitute a s. 161(1)(d)
order that prohibited contact by means of the Internet with persons under the age of 18 years. The Court of Appeal agreed, and it
modified the s. 161(1)(d) order to prohibit, for five years, use of
the Internet to access illegal content, communicate with persons
under the age of 18 years other than immediate family members,
or access social media, such as Facebook.
 In Brar, this court set aside [at para. 10] as demonstrably
unfit and unreasonable a s. 161(1)(d) order that consisted of
a 20-year prohibition on Internet use except when “at employment” and on the ownership or use of “any mobile device with
Internet capabilities”. In its place, this court substituted a 20-year
prohibition order along the lines of that imposed in Perron.