Mr. Brar pleaded guilty to counts of sexual assault, prostitution of a person less than 18 years of age and child luring. In
substituting a less restrictive s. 161(1)(d) order, this court focused
on several factors: ( i) the initial order’s restriction on the ownership of Internet capable devices fell outside the permitted ambit
of a s. 161(1)(d) order; ( ii) the order imposed would be particularly onerous on Mr. Brar’s ability to secure employment given that
it limited access to his place of employment, as well as in light of
his occupational history as a computer science specialist and IT
technician; ( iii) modern life requires some form of access to the
Internet for innocent purposes; and ( iv) Mr. Brar did not pose
many of the risks s. 161(1)(d) was designed to prevent, such as
the possession or distribution of child pornography.
 Since Brar, s. 161(1)(d) has been considered by other
 In R. v. Miller,  N.J. No. 115, 2017 NLCA 22,
354 C.C.C. (3d) 58, the accused entered a guilty plea to a charge of
possessing child pornography. The sentence imposed included
a s. 161(1)(d) order that prohibited Mr. Miller from using a computer to communicate with persons under the age of 16 years.
The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal dismissed an
appeal from that order. It held that in assessing whether an
offender poses a risk to children for the purposes of justifying an
order under s. 161, a sentencing judge is entitled to consider not
only the results of relevant risk assessment tests, but also the
facts and circumstances of a particular offence and/or offender: at
paras. 21 and 27-28. The court concluded that the large volume of
images, their violent content, the tender ages of the children
depicted, and the period of time over which Mr. Miller had viewed
the images demonstrated that he posed a risk to children, justifying making the s. 161(1)(d) order: at paras. 31-35.
 Finally, in R. v. Athey,  B.C.J. No. 2032, 2017 BCCA
350, the offender pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, the making of child pornography and sexual interference.
The police had seized from the offender’s devices child pornography consisting of approximately 2,300 still images and 27 videos.
As part of the sentence, the sentencing court imposed a 20-year
prohibition order under s. 161(1)(d). Unfortunately, neither the
sentencing nor appeal reasons described the precise scope of the
order. The British Columbia Court of Appeal reduced the duration of the prohibition order to ten years and modified the order
to permit the offender “if his employment so requires it, to use
the Internet or other digital networks on digital equipment provided by the employer during his working hours for purposes of
his employer’s business”: at para. 51.