The present case
 At the time she sentenced the appellant, the sentencing
judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision in
J. (K.R.). Nevertheless, her reasons, when read as a whole,
disclose that she considered the factors relevant to making
a s. 161(1)(d) prohibition order — that is, whether the order constitutes ( i) a reasonable attempt to minimize the risk the offender
poses to children; and ( ii) a careful response to the offender’s
 Although Brar did not involve a conviction concerning child
pornography, in that case this court indicated, at para. 22, that the
possession of child pornography is one of the risks s. 161(1)(d) was
enacted to prevent. Here, the appellant possessed a significant
amount of child pornography. In her reasons, the sentencing judge
observed that the appellant possessed some 101 images and 155
videos of child pornography. The material consisted of 45 unique
images and 111 unique movies. As the sentencing judge stated,
“[t]hose are 156 victimized children”. The psychological assessment report prepared by Dr. Sandra Jackson noted that the files
possessed by the appellant depicted pre-pubescent youth engaged
in various sexual acts with adult males and other youth and some
of the files involved very explicit images of child abuse.
 The possession of child pornography poses a grave risk to
children. The sentencing judge specifically noted the case law that
characterizes the possession of child pornography as an abhorrent
crime that causes extreme harm: R. v. Nisbet,  O.J. No. 101,
2011 ONCA 26, at para. 1; R. v. Sharpe,  1 S.C.R. 45, 
S.C.J. No. 3, 2001 SCC 2, at para. 158 (concurring); and R. v.
Lynch-Staunton,  O.J. No. 313, 2012 ONSC 218 (S.C.J.),
at para. 49.
 The risk the appellant poses to children by possessing child
pornography arose from his use of devices that accessed the
Internet. There was no evidence the appellant had contacted or
attempted to contact children. Given those circumstances, the
sentencing judge did not accede to the Crown’s request to grant
a prohibition order under s. 161(1)(a)-(c). Instead, she limited the
order to the means by which the appellant posed a risk to
children — his use of the Internet.
 In fashioning the overall sentence, the sentencing judge
also took into account the results of Dr. Jackson’s risk assessment, which assessed him as a low risk for sexual recidivism.
 The specific conditions the sentencing judge imposed
in the s. 161(1)(d) prohibition order, while strict, nonetheless
carefully responded to the offender’s specific circumstances. The