The trial judge noted that the goals of denunciation, and
general and specific deterrence took precedence in these types of
offences. He said:
The Courts have made it clear that in sentencing for these types of offences
denunciation, general and specific deterrence and the need to separate the
offender from society take precedence over the other recognized objectives of
sentencing. The Court has a duty to seek to protect children who are our
most vulnerable and our most valued assets in our society. The sentences
imposed must be sufficiently punitive to demonstrate society’s revulsion and
condemnation and to demonstrate to the accused and to those who are
like-minded that the consequences of such conduct will be dire.
 He noted that “even where an accused might not qualify as
the worst offender the maximum sentence might well be appropriate if it is a fit sentence in the light of the gravity of the offence
and the degree of responsibility of the accused”. He also referred
to the investigating officer’s opinion that the appellant would be
likely to re-offend.
 The sentencing judge noted the principle of totality, acknowledging that he was required to ensure that the sentences imposed,
together, did not result in a penalty that was unduly harsh or
exceeded that which would be appropriate in the circumstances.
B. Submissions on appeal
 I will elaborate on the parties’ submissions in more detail
in the “Analysis” section of these reasons. The following brief
summary will put the issues in context.
Submissions of the appellant
 While the appellant acknowledges that the sentence for
distribution of child pornography should be at the high end of the
range, he submits that the sentencing judge did not give adequate
consideration to the totality principle in considering the sentences
for the other offences and the sentence as a whole, resulting in
a sentence that was disproportionate and unfit. He characterizes
the sexual assaults and the making of child pornography as being
at the low to medium level of severity and the sexual interference
as part and parcel of the child pornography offences. He submits
that the trial judge’s failure to recognize that the offences were
not the most serious resulted in a total sentence that was excessive, particularly when compared to sentences imposed on other
offenders for similar offences.
 He also submits that the sentencing judge made errors in
principle in treating the appellant’s lack of remorse as aggravating and in making the sentences on counts 3 (possessing child
pornography) and 7 (sexual interference) consecutive.