motion judge found that the Auditor had access to the names and
accounts of every member of the Class. Again, this is incorrect.
The record demonstrates that Buckingham’s clients and their
accounts changed regularly and the Auditor was not engaged to
perform a continuous audit.
 In my view, both of these palpable and overriding errors
further distance the Auditor from the Class and undermine the
motion judge’s proximity analysis.
 The fourth factor weighing against a finding of proximity
in this case is the relevant statutory scheme. While the Class does
not contend that the duty of care arises by the direct operation of
any statute, the statutory scheme nonetheless provides relevant
context for assessing the sufficiency of proximity between parties:
Livent, at para. 29. Here, the statutory scheme required Buckingham, as a securities dealer, to segregate investor assets and maintain a net free capital, and to file an audited Form 9 Report with
the OSC that confirmed that it had met these obligations:
General, ss. 107, 117-118, 142 and 144. In my view, it cannot be said
that these provisions are sufficient to ground a relationship of
proximity between a securities dealer’s auditor and its account
holders for the purpose of this case. While the Auditor was
required to audit Buckingham’s Form 9 Reports in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards and audit requirements published by the OSC, the statutory scheme did not create
a proximate relationship between the Auditor and the Class for
the purpose of their investment decisions in relation to forms that
they never saw.
 Finally, I am conscious of the Supreme Court’s admonition
that significant scrutiny is warranted when deciding whether to
recognize a duty of care in a claim for pure economic loss: Martel
Building Ltd. v. Canada,  2 S.C.R. 860,  S.C.J. No. 60,
2000 SCC 60, at para. 35; R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.,
 3 S.C.R. 45,  S.C.J. No. 42, 2011 SCC 42, at para. 42.
While there is no automatic bar to recovery for pure economic
loss, such claims warrant more rigorous examination than other
claims for negligence: Martel, at para. 35; Mandeville v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. (2014), 120 O.R. (3d) 81,  O.J. No.
2451, 2014 ONCA 417, at paras. 148-50, leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused  S.C.C.A. No. 390. This consideration further
weighs against finding proximity in this case.
 In summary, I am of the view that the Class’s claim fails at
the proximity stage of the Anns/Cooper analysis. When properly
scrutinized in the light of the Livent decision and other
jurisprudence, the Class’s claim cannot survive because there is no