years after the litigation commenced), to prepare a drawing of
a bathroom vanity he had built without a drawing. His evidence
on that point is in direct conflict with Ms. Fiume’s evidence that
Ms. Wilkes had approved the construction of all of the vanities
after she was shown the drawings.
 The trial judge accepted the Fiumes’ evidence as entirely
credible. He did so without making any reference to Mr.
Derewonko’s evidence in his reasons for judgment.
 The respondents argue that there is no requirement for
a trial judge to “refer to every item of evidence considered or to
detail the way each item of evidence was assessed” (see R. v. H.
(J.M.) (2011), 113 O.R. (3d) 80,  3 S.C.R. 197,  S.C.J.
No. 45, 2011 SCC 45, at para. 32). They submit that there are
very good reasons for the trial judge to have rejected the evidence
of Birkshire’s two former employees, or to have considered it to
be irrelevant to the issues at hand. In their view, even if credibility played a role, there is no reason to interfere with the trial
judge’s factual findings since he effectively explained why he preferred the respondents’ evidence over that of the appellants.
 We disagree. Considering the record as a whole, including
the fact that the trial judge reopened the case to hear the evidence of the two witnesses after determining that it could bear on
the material issue of the respondents’ credibility, the trial judge’s
failure to address this evidence in his reasons creates problems on
appeal. Credibility played an important role in the trial, in which
the central issue was the scope and terms of the home renovation
contract. The trial judge rejected the evidence of the appellants
on several points and he explained why he preferred the evidence
of the respondents. If Mr. Derewonko’s evidence had been accepted, it would have meant that a drawing that was introduced by the
respondents at trial as being contemporaneous with Birkshire’s
work, was created well after the litigation had commenced. Such
evidence could have had a material effect on the credibility of the
respondents, and indeed on the administration of justice.
 Although we specifically refrain from commenting upon the
credibility of the evidence led by the appellants when they
reopened their case, it was incumbent on the trial judge to at least
advert to the evidence and resolve it. This is particularly true given
that the trial judge had pre-determined the materiality of the evidence, acknowledging that it was sufficiently probative of credibility
to justify the exercise of his discretion in favour of reopening the
 As this court noted in Dovbush v. Mouzitchka (2016), 131
O.R. (3d) 474,  O.J. No. 2627, 2016 ONCA 381, at para. 29,
“[a] trial judge owes the losing party an explanation for rejecting