conjunction with a typical supply and demand curve, that the
equilibrium price of all LIBs would have been higher as a result
of the conspiracy.
 The fact that the respondents’ expert disagrees with Dr.
Reutter that class-wide harm can be established on a common basis
is of no moment at this point in the litigation. At the certification
stage, the court is not required to resolve conflicting evidence:
Pro-Sys, at paras. 102, 126. In fact, at this stage, the court is not
equipped to engage in such an analysis: Cloud, at para. 50. The
resolution of the disparities in the expert evidence is a matter for
the trial judge, who will have the benefit of a full record at the
trial of the common issues: Pro-Sys, at para. 126.
 Ultimately, it may be shown that Dr. Reutter’s methodology
is not capable of proving harm to the umbrella purchasers. The
comments of the Supreme Court in Pro-Sys, at para. 105, which
refer to the British Columbia class proceedings legislation but apply
equally to the Ontario Class Proceedings Act, are apposite here:
I think it important to emphasize that the Canadian approach at the
certification stage does not allow for an extensive assessment of the complexities
and challenges that a plaintiff may face in establishing its case at trial. After
an action has been certified, additional information may come to light calling
into question whether the requirements of s. 4(1) continue to be met. It is for
this reason that enshrined in the CPA is the power of the court to decertify
the action if at any time it is found that the conditions for certification are no
longer met (s. 10(1)).
 These comments were echoed by this court in Cloud,
where the court highlights, in the context of its preferable
procedure analysis, at para. 90, the “great flexibility” of process
provided by the Class Proceedings Act. As the action unfolds,
where it appears that the certification requirements cease to be
met, the court may, pursuant to s. 10, amend the certification
order, decertify the proceeding or make any other order
 We acknowledge therefore that issues may arise with
respect to the umbrella purchasers when the expert evidence is
further developed and tested on the merits at the common issues
trial. However, the fact that a question may give rise to nuanced
answers as between class members does not defeat commonality:
Rumley v. British Columbia,  3 S.C.R. 184,  S.C.J. No.
39, 2001 SCC 69, at para. 32; Vivendi Canada Inc. v. Dell’Aniello,
 1 S.C.R. 3,  S.C.J. No. 1, 2014 SCC 1, at para. 44.
 Accordingly, we are satisfied that the question of class-wide harm should be certified as a common question.