a) Does the measure infringe s. 2(b)?
 There is no doubt that the activity in which the applicant
wishes to engage — public advocacy of policy change — is within
the guarantee of freedom of expression. McLachlin J. (as she then
was) stated in R. v. Keegstra,  3 S.C.R. 697,  S.C.J. No.
131 [at para. 271] that, “if the activity being regulated has expressive content, and does not convey a meaning through a violent
form, then it is prima facie protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter”.
Indeed, the Attorney General here does not doubt that the applicant engages in political expression — that is the very reason it
seeks to revoke the applicant’s status as a registered charity. The
applicant explicitly engages in “expression to the end of
promoting . . . political or social participation”, the very definition
of s. 2(b) activity: Canada v. Native Women’s Assn. of Canada,
 3 S.C.R. 627,  S.C.J. No. 93, at para. 44.
 It is the government’s position that nothing about
s. 149.1(6.2) of the ITA infringes the applicant’s freedom of
expression. As counsel for the Attorney General sees it, charitable
status under the ITA is a tax benefit, which is economically the
same as a government subsidy. The Attorney General rejects the
notion that “a denial of tax exemption to those wishing to
advocate certain opinions is a denial of freedom of expression”
(Human Life International in Canada Inc. v. M.N.R., 
F.C.J. No. 365,  3 F.C. 202 (C.A.), at para. 18), arguing that
the applicant has a right to free speech, not to subsidized speech.
 In essence, the government contends that the applicant is
raising a positive rights claim that does not fit within the structure
of Charter rights. Counsel for the Attorney General analogizes this
to “platform” cases such as Haig v. Canada,  2 S.C.R. 995,
 S.C.J. No. 84, where the challenger sought to vote in
a referendum in order to express his views on constitutional
reform, and Baier v. Alberta,  2 S.C.R. 673,  S.C.J.
No. 31, where the challenger sought to run for school trustee in
order to express his views on education policy. In doing so, the
Attorney General relies on the testimony of the applicant’s
executive director to the effect that the applicant depends on its
charitable status for financial viability, without which it would
not be able to pursue its charitable purposes.
 This position was perhaps most forcefully described in
Haig, at p. 1035 S.C.R.: “the freedom of expression contained in
s. 2(b) prohibits gags, but does not compel the distribution of
megaphones”. For the Attorney General in the present case,
registered charitable status is a megaphone and its deprivation
does not amount to a gag.