secure and cohesive Canada by 2020. It also features a call for vigorous and
sustained action by the federal government to combat the structural causes of
poverty in Canada.
 This activity is, of course, squarely within the charitable
purpose of relief of poverty. It also represents a means of achieving
that purpose that is recognized by the federal legislature itself. In
the Standing Committee report, p. 90, Parliament signalled that it
is important for organizations engaged in poverty relief to adopt
“a broad understanding of poverty and social exclusion to address
the root causes of these problems”. The Standing Committee
recommended that in achieving this broad understanding, there
needs to be a “shift in perspective” that generally reflects the
approach taken in the Copenhagen Declaration. That is, it
acknowledged that reducing poverty needs to be accomplished by
engaging with community organizations and people living in poverty
in support of those constituencies organizing and advocating for
changes to laws and policies.
 Simply put, there is no way to pursue the applicant’s
charitable purpose — using methodology that is recognized as
necessary by Parliament itself — while restricting its politically
expressive activity to 10 per cent of its resources as required by
CRA under s. 149.1(6.2). As counsel for the applicant points out,
the applicant does not claim a right to engage in political objectives or purposes; rather, it seeks to pursue its existing charitable
purpose through means which are self-evidently expressive and
protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter. In effect, the language of
s. 149.1(6.2), and CRA’s 10 per cent rule in application of that
statutory provision, makes the applicant’s charitable purpose
 Moreover, the evidence is that the applicant cannot function
— or will have difficulty in functioning — in the absence of registered charitable status. The Attorney General presents no evidence
that counters the applicant’s description of its needs. The charity
registration platform created by the ITA exists to support charitable works, and enforcement of s. 149.1(6.2), in burdening free
expression, seriously impairs those works.
 As with state-imposed burdens on religious practice,
a state-imposed burden on political expression need not amount
to an outright prohibition. Any burden, including a cost burden,
imposed by government on the exercise of a fundamental freedom
such as religion or expression can qualify as an infringement of
that right or freedom if it is not “trivial or insubstantial”: R. v.
Jones,  2 S.C.R. 284,  S.C.J. No. 56, at p. 314 S.C.R.
(per Wilson J., dissenting).