As if anticipating the very type of burden on s. 2(b) alleged
by the applicant, in Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 
1 S.C.R. 827,  S.C.J. No. 28, at p. 841 S.C.R., McLachlin
C.J.C. and Major J. (dissenting in part) put the matter in terms of
effective political expression:
The right to participate in political discourse is a right to effective participation
— for each citizen to play a “meaningful” role in the democratic process . . .
s. 2(b) aspires to protect “the interest of the individual in effectively
communicating his or her message to members of the public . . .”
The ability to engage in effective speech in the public square means nothing if
it does not include the ability to attempt to persuade one’s fellow citizen
through debate and discussion. This is the kernel from which reasoned political
 In R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.,  2 S.C.R. 713,
 S.C.J. No. 70, at para. 97, the Supreme Court reasoned that
“[f]or a state-imposed cost or burden to be proscribed by
s. 2(a) it must be capable of interfering with religious belief or
practice.” The evidence of the applicant is uncontroverted that
this test is met with respect to the analogous state-imposed cost
or burden on its rights under s. 2(b).
 The applicant, a registered charity, has a right to effective
freedom of expression — i.e., the ability to engage in unimpaired
public policy advocacy toward its charitable purpose. The burden
imposed by the impugned section of the ITA and by the policy
measure adopted by CRA in administering that section runs
counter to that right.
 The applicant is therefore in a position that is akin to that
of the agricultural workers in Dunmore. The shortcomings of
a legislative regime undermine or burden the exercise of a Charter
right. This burden prevents or impairs the right holder from
taking advantage of a state-supplied platform that it could otherwise
freely access were it not for its insistence on exercising that right.
The applicant’s right to freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the
Charter is thereby infringed.
b) Is the measure justified under s. 1?
 When it comes to fundamental Charter guarantees such as
political advocacy and freedom of expression, “[t]he Court must
be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and
democratic society”: R. v. Oakes,  1 S.C.R. 103,  S.C.J.
No. 7, at p. 136 S.C.R. Having found that s. 149.1(6.2)(c) of the
ITA violates s. 2(b) of the Charter in that it burdens the applicant’s pursuit of public policy advocacy, it is necessary to turn to
s. 1 of the Charter. The burden at this point shifts to the Attorney