General to establish that the infringement is reasonable and
justified in a free and democratic society.
 In considering whether the ITA’s limits on the applicant’s
freedom of expression are so justified, the analysis follows the
Oakes test. In full, the test considers whether the legislative
objective is pressing and substantial, whether the means chosen
by the legislature is rationally connected to the objective, whether
the legislation minimally impairs the right of free expression, and
whether it is proportional considering the deleterious and salutary
effects on the right. These must be addressed in sequence. The
failure of the government to pass any one of the hurdles results in
the conclusion that the infringement of the Charter is unjustified.
 The first question to arise under Oakes is whether, as one
scholar has put it, the state’s action under challenge has “good
ends”. That is, “[t]o be justified, the state’s action [has] to be
motivated by acceptable ends”: Charles-Maxime Panaccio, “The
Justification of Rights Infringements: Section 1 of the Charter”,
in P. Oliver, P. Macklem and N. Des Rosiers, eds., Handbook of the
Canadian Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
In the more familiar language of Oakes, the question is whether
s. 149.1(6.2) embodies a “pressing and substantial objective”.
 McLachlin C.J.C. has opined that for limitations on political
speech to be justified under s. 1, they “must be supported by
a clear and convincing demonstration that they are necessary, do not
go too far, and enhance more than harm the democratic process”:
B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British
Columbia (Attorney General),  1 S.C.R. 93,  S.C.J. No.
6, at para. 16. Justice Cory, writing for the plurality of the
Supreme Court in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General),
 2 S.C.R. 1326,  S.C.J. No. 124, at p. 1336 S.C.R., put
the matter even higher and observed that “[ i]t is difficult to
imagine a guaranteed right more important to a democratic
society than freedom of expression. . . . It seems that the rights
enshrined in s. 2(b) should therefore only be restricted in the
clearest of circumstances.”
 Counsel for the Attorney General identifies the objective of
s. 149.1(6.2) with reference to the Department of Finance
Technical Notes. Those notes identify the objective of the section
as being to
. . . recognize that it is appropriate for a registered charity to use its
resources, within defined limits, for ancillary and incidental political activities
in support of its charitable goals, and
prohibit partisan political activities “such as supporting or opposing a politi-
cal party or candidate”.