On its face, s. 36(1) confers a private right of action to
“[a]ny person who has suffered loss or damage” arising from
“conduct that is contrary to”, in this case, s. 45 of the Competition
Act. The language is broad and inclusive. Conspicuously absent
from s. 36(1) is any restriction on who can claim losses.
 On a plain reading, if the umbrella purchasers can prove
loss resulting from a proven conspiracy under s. 45, s. 36(1)
grants those purchasers a statutory means by which to recover
those losses. Taking the language at face value, the umbrella
purchasers’ right of recovery is limited only by their ability to
demonstrate two things: (1) that the respondents conspired
within the meaning of s. 45; and (2) that the losses or damages
suffered by the appellants resulted from that conspiracy.
 Thus, a plain reading of ss. 36 and 45 supports the appellants’
position. Admittedly, however, the plain meaning is not the end of
the matter. We turn next to the purpose of the Competition Act.
( iii) Purpose of the Competition Act
 Section 1.1 of the Competition Act sets out its purpose,
including the desire to “maintain and encourage competition in
Canada in order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the
Canadian economy”, as well as providing consumers with “com-
petitive prices and product choices”.
 Various authorities have extended the purpose of the
Competition Act beyond what is set out in s. 1.1, including reference to the Act’s promotion of compensation and deterrence:
Infineon Technologies AG v. Option consommateurs,  3 S.C.R.
600,  S.C.J. No. 59, 2013 SCC 59, at para. 111; Sun-Rype
Products Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.,  3 S.C.R. 545,
 S.C.J. No. 58, 2013 SCC 58, at paras. 24-27; Pro-Sys, at
paras. 46-49. Moreover, the “overall objective” of the Competition
Act has been described as serving to promote “vigorous and fair
competition throughout Canada”: R. v. Wholesale Travel Group
Inc. (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 799,  3 S.C.R. 154,  S.C.J. No.
79, at pp. 256-57 S.C.R.
 It seems self-evident that when clandestine agreements
between competitors are made to increase prices and lessen
competition, ones that result in actual harm to consumers, that
the purposes of the Competition Act are thwarted. Conspiracies
among competitors to fix prices and lessen competition are the
very antithesis of the Competition Act’s objective of promoting
competition. Undoubtedly, where there is a wider berth for liability,
the greater the availability of compensation for harm flowing
from prohibited conduct, the greater the deterrent effect flowing
from the award of damages, and the greater the protection for