a strong, vibrant and healthy economy. In our view, interpreting
s. 36(1) in a way that includes all those who have suffered losses
as a result of a conspiracy — both umbrella and non-umbrella
purchasers — accords with the purposes of the Competition Act.
( iv) Relevant legal norms
 The respondents urge the court to apply a contextual
approach, one that draws from the legal norms that inform the
setting within which s. 36(1) resides. They maintain that the
Divisional Court correctly took that broader context into account
when applying the principle of indeterminate liability to s. 36(1)
of the Competition Act, thereby placing the statutory provision
beyond the reach of umbrella purchasers.
 In making that argument, the respondents point to two
cases in which negligence principles have been applied to statutory
claims in the past: Taylor v. 1103919 Alberta Ltd.,  A.J. No.
652, 2015 ABCA 201, 19 Alta. L.R. (6th) 407; Haughton v. Burden,
 O.J. No. 4704, 110 A.C.W.S. (3d) 264 (S.C.J.). The Taylor
judgment involves the principle of remoteness being applied to
a statutory claim under the Land Titles Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-4.
The Haughton judgment involves that same principle being applied
to a statutory claim under the Liquor Licence Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. L.19. The respondents suggest that because remoteness has been
applied to statutory claims, then indeterminate liability should
apply to s. 36 of the Competition Act.
 The appellants, on the other hand, urge this court to find
that the principle of indeterminate liability has no application
outside of the negligence context. They maintain that indeterminate liability is a concept that resides only within the second
prong of the Anns/Cooper test, a test that is designed to ascertain
whether a duty of care exists in the negligence context: Anns
v. Merton London Borough Council,  A.C. 728,  2 All
E.R. 492 (U.K. H.L.); Cooper v. Hobart,  3 S.C.R. 537, 
S.C.J. No. 76, 2001 SCC 79. At a minimum, they say the principle
of indeterminate liability cannot be applied to claims that are
rooted in intentional conduct, like claims of conspiracy.
 The respondents answer the appellants’ submission by
saying that s. 36 creates liability for entirely non-intentional
conduct that can be proven on a negligence standard, such as
“deceptive telemarketing” and “deceptive notice of winning a prize”.
 It is important to remember what is and what is not at issue
on this appeal. We need not decide whether negligence concepts,
such as indeterminate liability, can never apply outside of the
negligence context, whether indeterminate liability can never
apply to a claim that requires proof of intention, or whether