indeterminate liability might apply to non-conspiracy rooted claims
under Part VI of the Competition Act. Nor do we have to decide
whether statutory claims are impermeable to negligence principles.
Rather, we need only decide a narrow question: does the principle
of indeterminate liability apply to the statutory claim under s. 36
for recovery arising from conspiratorial conduct under s. 45?
 Turning to that question, we agree with the respondents
that the court is obliged to consider the context within which the
provision resides: ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy
& Utilities Board),  1 S.C.R. 140,  S.C.J. No. 4, 2006
SCC 4, at para. 48. Indeed, to give life to its meaning, the court is
required to look to the purpose of the provision and to the
“relevant legal norms” amplifying it: R. v. Alex,  1 S.C.R.
967,  S.C.J. No. 37, 2017 SCC 37, at para. 31. (See, also,
McLean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 
3 S.C.R. 895,  S.C.J. No. 67, 2013 SCC 67, at para. 43;
Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed.
(Markham: LexisNexis, 2014), at s. 2.9.) However, while we agree
those interpretative principles must be applied, we disagree with
the way the respondents say they apply in this context.
 It is helpful to review how the concept of indeterminate
liability comes into play in the negligence context. In that context,
a court will apply the Anns/Cooper test in assessing whether the
defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff. At the first stage of
the test, the court considers proximity and foreseeability. If the
court concludes the defendant owes a prima facie duty of care to
the plaintiff, it will go on at the second stage of the test to consider
whether residual policy concerns, such as indeterminate liability,
negate the imposition of a duty of care. In Deloitte & Touche
v. Livent Inc. (Receiver of),  2 S.C.R. 855,  S.C.J. No.
63, 2017 SCC 63, at para. 43, the majority described what is
meant by indeterminate liability:
Indeterminate liability is liability of a specificcharacter, not of a specific
amount. In particular, indeterminate liability should not be confused with
significant liability. . . . Certain activities — like flying commercial aircraft,
manufacturing pharmaceutical drugs, or auditing a large corporation — may
well give rise to significant liability . . . [T]he liability arising from these “high
risk” undertakings may only be characterized as “indeterminate” if the scope of
such liability is impossible to ascertain (Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014),
sub verbo “indeterminate”). In other words, liability is truly “indeterminate” if
“the accepted sources of law and the accepted methods of working with those
sources such as deduction and analogy . . . are insufficient to resolve the
question” . . . More specifically, there are three pertinent aspects to so-called
“indeterminacy” in these cases: (1) value indeterminacy (“liability in an
indeterminate amount”); (2) temporal indeterminacy (“liability . . . for an
indeterminate time”); and (3) claimant indeterminacy (“liability . . . to an