administration of criminal justice. As explained in R. v. Grant,
 2 S.C.R. 353,  S.C.J. No. 32, 2009 SCC 32, at para. 70:
Finally, s. 24(2)’s focus is societal. Section 24(2) is not aimed at punishing
the police or providing compensation to the accused, but rather at systemic
concerns. The s. 24(2) focus is on the broad impact of admission of the evi-
dence on the long-term repute of the justice system.
 The rationale for the exclusionary rule identified in Grant,
as applied in these circumstances, requires a consideration of the
long-term impact on the reputation of the administration of
justice caused by the admission of evidence obtained in an investigation conducted under a police practice that inevitably and
routinely denies detained persons their constitutional right to
access counsel. The systemic nature of the violation plays a central role in assessing its long-term impact on the proper administration of justice.
 The three-pronged line of inquiry under s. 24(2) established in Grant is well known. A court looks to the seriousness of
the Charter-infringing state conduct, the impact of that conduct
on the Charter-protected interests of the accused, and society’s
interest in an adjudication on the merits: Grant, at paras. 72-86.
The first two factors, taken in combination, represent the case for
exclusion. The third provides the counterbalance favouring admission of the evidence.
(a) The seriousness of the state misconduct
 The trial judge described the state misconduct as “serious”
and reflective of the police disinterest in the appellant’s rights.
Those observations are fully justified. Apart entirely from never
turning their mind to the actual need to delay the appellant’s
access to counsel, the officers showed no interest in mitigating
the delay. For example, there is no evidence that the police con-
sidered obtaining a search warrant before arresting the appellant.
I see nothing in the circumstances that would have prevented the
police from obtaining the warrant first. This would have avoided,
or at least substantially minimized, any delay in affording the
appellant his constitutional right to speak with counsel. Even if
the police wanted the appellant out of the residence before exe-
cuting the warrant, they could have obtained the warrant,
watched the residence, arrested the appellant when he left and
proceeded to execute the warrant. Had the police followed that
procedure, they could have allowed the appellant immediate
access to counsel. Instead, by arresting the appellant before
obtaining the warrant, the police ensured that he would be held
without access to his lawyer for hours.