I. Limitation period commencement for unidentified
motorist coverage before the Limitations Act entered
 July was decided before the Limitations Act entered into
force. It considered the limitation period applicable to unidenti-
fied motorist coverage. After considering the limitation provision
of the unidentified motorist coverage regulation at the time,
which limited claims to two years from the date on which the
cause of action against the insurer arose, Mackinnon J. held, at
pp. 468 and 469 D.L.R.:
Section 6 of the regulation refers to the date of the accident as the date for
the time to run for the giving of notice and proof of claim. Section 8(2) states
the time shall run from “the date on which the cause of action against the
insurer arose . . . ” (emphasis added). As counsel for the appellants submitted,
if the Legislature intended time to run always and only from the date of the
accident in cases such as the instant one, the section would have been worded
as in s. 6. It would have been very simple to have worded the section in that
Although, as I have made clear, it is not without considerable difficulty,
I have concluded that the time begins to run under such circumstances as the
instant case, when the material facts on which the claim is based have been
discovered or ought to have been discovered by the plaintiff by the exercise of
reasonable diligence: Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse et al. [reported 31 D.L.R.
(4th) 481], Supreme Court of Canada, released October 9, 1986 — Le Dain J.
(for the court) at p. 99 [ p. 535 D.L.R.]. The former solicitor for the appellant,
in an affidavit filed on the motion, stated it was not until the examinations
for discovery of all parties on April 11, 1984, that it became apparent that
a possibility existed that no liability would attach to the defendant, but rather
that all of the liability would “rest” with the unidentified third vehicle. It will
be the responsibility of the trial judge on hearing the evidence to determine
whether the material facts, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, ought to
have been discovered earlier, and the date from which the limitation period
In coming to that conclusion I have had the following in mind. Insurance
policies are statutory contracts and the wording of the terms as in the instant
case normally are not the words of the insurer but the words of the statute or
of the regulation. To such terms the contra proferentem rule does not apply.
However, the insurance industry is consulted and does have input with
regard to legislation affecting the industry. The individual insured has none.
His role is to pay the premium for the expected indemnity. It appears to me
that if there is doubt in the legislation establishing and governing the cover,
and there are two possible interpretations of any aspect of the cover, the one
more favourable to the insured should govern: Stevenson v. Reliance Petroleum Ltd. (1956), 5 D.L.R. (2d) 673 at p. 683,  S.C.R. 936 at p. 949, 
I.L.R. D781998181-238; Watts v. Centennial Ins. Co. (1967), 65 D.L.R. (2d)
529 at pp. 533-4, 62 W. W.R. 175,  I.L.R. D781998181-220.
 The Court of Appeal applied its July reasoning in Johnson,
Hier and Chambo. The Court of Appeal decided these three cases
before the Limitations Act entered into force.