So, in order for the M.s’ duty to Jane to be vitiated under
s. 4(1) of the OLA, Jane must have accepted that N.M. would
physically harm her and that she would have no right to sue him
or his parents for her injuries.
 In R. v. Jobidon, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that
a person cannot consent to intentional application of force causing serious hurt or non-trivial bodily harm.11 A person may consent to participate in sporting activities that might result in
injury at the hands of another player, on the assumption that the
rules and usual practices of the game would be observed.12 A person may also consent to a schoolyard scuffle that could give rise to
trivial injuries. But, as a matter of public policy, a person cannot
agree to assume the risk that they will be physically battered or
threatened with bodily harm. I see no reason why this principle
should not apply in the context of activity that gives rise to civil
liability for battery and assault, as opposed to activity that might
rise to a criminal charge. As a result, I conclude that Jane could
not have voluntarily assumed the risk that N.M. would physically
harm her while she was a guest at the M.s’ home.
 I conclude that the M.s met the definition of an occupier of
their house under the OLA, and that they owed Jane a duty to
take reasonable care to ensure she was reasonably safe while on
(b) Did the M.s breach their duty of care to Jane?
The applicable standard of care
 As set out in s. 3(1) of the OLA, an occupier owes a duty to
take “such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasona-
ble to see that persons entering on the premises . . . are reasona-
bly safe” while on the premises. The particular standard of care,
and whether that standard has been met, is a question to be
determined on the facts of the case.13
 An occupier is liable under the OLA when they fail to take
reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm caused by someone
on the premises.14 Physical injury caused by other persons may
be foreseeable where the occupier knew that
11 R. v. Jobidon,  2 S.C.R. 714,  S.C.J. No. 65 (“Jobidon”), at
12 Jobidon, at paras. 125-132.
13 Waldick, at para. 19.
14 Waldick, at para. 19.