Privacy has long been recognized as an important underlying and animating
value of various traditional causes of action to protect personal and territorial
privacy. Charter jurisprudence recognizes privacy as a fundamental value in
our law and specifically identifies, as worthy of protection, a right to informational privacy that is distinct from personal and territorial privacy. The right
to informational privacy closely tracks the same interest that would be protected by a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion.21
 Sandra Jones and Winnie Tsige worked for the same bank.
They did not know each other, but Tsige was romantically
involved with Jones’ former husband. As a bank employee, Tsige
had access to Jones’ banking information. Using this access,
she looked into Jones’ banking records at least 174 times over
a period of four years. The information displayed included transactions details as well as personal information such as date of
birth, marital status and address. Tsige simply looked at the
information. She did not publish, distribute or record it in any way.
 After discovering what Tsige had done, Jones sued her
for breach of privacy. Her claim was summarily dismissed by
a motion judge on the grounds that her cause of action was not
recognized in Ontario. On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal
allowed Jones’ appeal and granted summary judgment in her
favour for damages in the amount of $10,000.
 In the absence of any established or statutorily created
tort in Ontario for invasion of privacy, the Court of Appeal in
Jones v. Tsige adopted the elements of the tort of intrusion on
seclusion set out in William Prosser’s influential 1960 article on
privacy law.22 This was one of four breach of privacy torts identi-
fied by Prosser, which include
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his
(2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
(3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
(4) appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.
21 Jones v. Tsige, at para. 66.
22 William L. Prosser, “Privacy” (1960), 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, cited in Jones v.
Tsige, at para. 16.