simply proclaimed a sweeping right to privacy and left it to the courts to
define the contours of that right.25
 Third, in concluding that a right of action for intrusion on
seclusion should be recognized, the court emphasized that the
common law must respond to problems created by new technolo-
For over one hundred years, technological change has motivated the legal
protection of the individual’s right to privacy. In modern times, the pace of
technological change has accelerated exponentially. Legal scholars such as
Peter Burns have written of “the pressing need to preserve ‘privacy’ which is
being threatened by science and technology to the point of surrender”. . . .
The Internet and digital technology have brought an enormous change in the
way we communicate and in our capacity to capture, store and retrieve
information. As the facts of this case indicate, routinely kept electronic data-
bases render our most personal financial information vulnerable. Sensitive
information as to our health is similarly available, as are records of the books
we have borrowed or bought, the movies we have rented or downloaded,
where we have shopped, where we have travelled and the nature of our com-
munications by cellphone, e-mail or text message.26
 Finally, the court invoked the longstanding principle that
there is no right without a remedy. Had it not accepted the exist-
ence of a tort of intrusion on seclusion, Jones would have been
deprived of any recourse in the face of an intentional breach of
her privacy rights by Tsige:
Finally, and most importantly, we are presented in this case with facts that
cry out for a remedy. While Tsige is apologetic and contrite, her actions were
deliberate, prolonged and shocking. Any person in Jones’ position would be
profoundly disturbed by the significant intrusion into her highly personal
information. The discipline administered by Tsige’s employer was governed
by the principles of employment law and the interests of the employer and
did not respond directly to the wrong that had been done to Jones. In my
view, the law of this province would be sadly deficient if we were required to
send Jones away without a legal remedy.27
Jane Doe 464533
 In Jane Doe 464533, Stinson J. granted default judgment
for damages based on the posting of an intimate video on a pornography website without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent.
He held the defendant N.D. liable on three alternative causes of
action: breach of confidence, intentional infliction of mental
25 Jones v. Tsige, at para. 54.
26 Jones v. Tsige, at para. 67 (cites omitted).
27 Jones v. Tsige, at para. 69.