distress and invasion of privacy.28 After Stinson J. released his
decision, N.D. moved successfully to set it aside, on the basis that
the defendant had an arguable defence on the merits and that it
would be in the interests of justice to allow the case to proceed to
a full hearing.29 This does not make Stinson J.’s analysis of invasion of privacy less important or persuasive.
 Like Jane and N.M., Jane Doe 464533 and N.D. met in
high school and dated for a while. After they broke up, they
remained friends and stayed in touch. At about this time, N.D.
began asking the plaintiff to make a sexually explicit video of herself to send to him. N.D. had sent her several intimate pictures
and videos of himself and told her that she “owed him” a video of
herself in turn. The plaintiff eventually gave in and recorded
a video. Before sending it to N.D., she texted him, telling him she
was still unsure. He convinced her to send it to him, reassuring
her that no one else would see it. Based on these reassurances,
the plaintiff sent the video to N.D.
 Three weeks later, the plaintiff learned that N.D. had
posted the video to an Internet pornography site the same day he
had received it. The video was entitled “college girl pleasures herself for ex boyfriends delight”. The plaintiff also learned that N.D.
shown it to their former high school classmates. She took steps to
have the video removed from the site, but was “devastated,
humiliated and distraught” by what N.D. had done.
 After finding that the defendant’s posting of the sexually
explicit video was a breach of confidence and an intentional infliction of mental distress, Stinson J. considered whether a cause of
action for invasion of privacy should also be recognized on the facts
of the case. He reviewed the Court of Appeal’s decision in Jones v.
Tsige, focusing in particular on the constitutional status of the
right of privacy and the need for courts to fashion adapt remedies
to address problems caused by technological change. He concluded
that, just as the Court of Appeal recognized the tort of intrusion on
seclusion in that case, it was appropriate to recognize Prosser’s
second breach of privacy tort, public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts, on the facts of Jane Doe 464533.
 In the Restatement (Second) of Torts (2010), this tort is
described as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
28 Jane Doe 464533, at paras. 20 to 48.
29 Jane Doe 464533 v. D. (N.),  O.J. No. 60, 2017 ONSC 127 (S.C.J.).