publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.30
 The comment section of the Restatement offers the follow-
ing rationale and scope of the tort:
Every individual has some phases of his life and his activities and some facts
about himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely to
himself or at most reveals only to his family or to close friends. Sexual rela-
tions, for example, are normally entirely private matters, as are family quar-
rels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses, most intimate
personal letters, most details of a man’s life in his home, and some of his past
history that he would rather forget. When these intimate details of his life are
spread before the public gaze in a manner highly offensive to the ordinarily
reasonable man, there is an actionable invasion of his privacy, unless the mat-
ter is one of legitimate public interest.31
 Stinson J. noted that Prosser’s description of the tort did not
anticipate the development of social media and the Internet, but
that recognizing it would give courts the necessary remedy for an
intentional breach of privacy enabled by these technologies:
Plainly, writing in 1960, Prosser was discussing events that might occur in
a pre-Internet world, where the concepts of pornographic websites and cyber-
bullying could never have been imagined. Nevertheless, the essence of the
cause of action he described is the unauthorized public disclosure of private
facts relating to the plaintiff that would be considered objectionable by any
reasonable person. In the electronic and Internet age in which we all now
function, private information, private facts and private activities may be more
and more rare, but they are no less worthy of protection. Personal and private
communications and the private sharing of intimate details of persons’ lives
remain essential activities of human existence and day to day living.
To permit someone who has been confidentially entrusted with such details
— and in particular intimate images — to intentionally reveal them to the
world via the internet, without legal recourse, would be to leave a gap in our
system of remedies.32
 Stinson J. concluded that the elements of the cause of
action for public disclosure of private facts in the Restatement
should be adopted, with one minor modification:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of the other’s privacy, if the mat-
ter publicized or the act of the publication (a) would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
(Modification shown by underlining)33
30 Cited in Jane Doe 464533, at para. 41.
31 Jane Doe 464533, at para. 42.
32 Jane Doe 464533, at paras. 44 and 45.
33 Jane Doe 464533, at para. 46.