Having recognized this tort, Stinson J. went on to find that
N.D. was liable for public disclosure of the intimate video of the
plaintiff. He held that N.D. had made public an aspect of the
plaintiff’s private life, and that a reasonable person would find
the unauthorized public disclosure of such a video to be highly
offensive. He also found that there was no legitimate public concern that justified N.D.’s actions.
Should a tort of public disclosure of private facts be recognized?
 In 2014, Parliament enacted Bill C-13, the Protecting
Canadians from Online Crime Act, S.C. 2014, c. 31. It added the
offence of publication of an intimate image without consent to the
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.34 An intimate image includes
a video recording in which the person depicted is engaged in an
explicit sexual activity. Someone convicted of this offence may be
sentenced to up to five years in prison.
 Where misconduct is identified as wrong, harmful and
antithetical to an orderly society such that it attracts a criminal
sanction, it makes sense that the same misconduct should give
rise to a civil remedy. For example, in the case at bar, N.M. was
convicted for his criminal assault of Jane in March 2014, and she
has a civil remedy (battery) against him for this same conduct.
The criminal charge is based on the collective interest in deterring and sanctioning violent and anti-social behaviour. The civil
remedy allows the victim to recover damages for their injury.
 Parliament’s criminalization of the publication of an intimate image without consent recognizes that this behaviour is
highly offensive and should give rise to a civil remedy for a person
who suffers damages as a result of it. The only question is how
this is best accomplished.
 I conclude that the best way of fashioning a civil remedy is
to adopt the tort of public disclosure of private facts in Ontario.
In doing so I rely on the same reasoning that led the Court of
Appeal to recognize the related tort of intrusion on seclusion in
Jones v. Tsige.
 The adoption of this tort is consistent with Charter values.
In R. v. Dyment, a case cited in Jones v. Tsige, La Forest J. stated
[at para. 17] that “privacy is essential for the well-being of the
individual. For this reason alone, it is worthy of constitutional
protection, but it also has profound significance for the public
34 Section 162.1 of the Criminal Code, which came into force on March 9,