of private facts is hardly new or novel. It has existed in U.S. law
for decades. Despite its vintage, it is well-suited for use in the
context of Internet posting and distribution of intimate and
sexually explicit images and recordings. It is the cousin to another
privacy tort already recognized in Ontario, intrusion on seclusion.
As such, it is an appropriate, proportionate legal response to
a growing problem enabled by new technology.
 Finally, failing to provide a remedy in this case would
deprive Jane of any meaningful recourse in the face of a deliberate
and flagrant breach of her privacy rights. In Jones v. Tsige, the
Court of Appeal characterized Tsige’s actions in accessing Jones’
personal banking records as “deliberate, prolonged and shocking”,
and said that the case cried out for a remedy. But, in that case,
Tsige took no steps to record, publish or distribute the plaintiff’s
information, and Jones suffered no long-term damages as a result
of the breach of her privacy rights. In the case at bar, the explicit
video that N.M. posted without Jane’s knowledge of consent
remained online for over two years and was viewed over 60,000
times. The damage suffered by Jane is profound and still ongoing.
How can the court deny her a remedy in these circumstances?
 I conclude that Jane has a cause of action against N.M. for
the public disclosure of private facts without her consent. In
Jones v. Tsige, the Court of Appeal recognized the need for civil
remedies to protect the privacy of personal information. I see no
reason why this protection should not extend to prevent the
unauthorized publication of intimate images, given the privacy
rights at stake and the serious harm caused by such publication.
Is N.M. liable for public disclosure of private information
on the evidence here?
 I agree with the elements of the cause of action proposed
by Stinson J. [at para. 41] which for convenience sake I will
reproduce again here:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of the other’s privacy, if the mat-
ter publicized or the act of the publication (a) would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
 I accept Stinson J.’s modification to the description of the
tort in the Restatement, because it is important to emphasize
that a sexually explicit videotape is not in itself necessarily
“highly offensive”. There is nothing inherently wrong about
taking intimate photos of an adult or filming consensual sex
between adults, or agreeing to participate in such photos or
recordings. What is wrong is the non-consensual publication or