Gas Co. (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 336,  O.J. No. 3669, 1980 CanLII
1850 (C.A.), at p. 344 O.R., holding that even if a privately
appointed receiver manager acts as the debtor’s agent in operating
a business in receivership, the receiver is acting as agent of the
appointing creditor when realizing upon the security and selling
the property free of the appointing creditor’s mortgage.
 This case addresses the one remaining question where the
law has not yet been settled. Unlike a privately appointed
receiver or receiver manager, a court-appointed receiver is neither the agent of the creditor nor of the debtor. While this particular claim for s. 17 interest is advanced by the very creditor who
sought the appointment of the receiver by the court, this case also
illustrates the multi-faceted nature of court-appointed receiverships. Each of the debtors’ properties was subject to multiple
mortgages the holders of which might also have been advancing
similar interest claims even if they did not append their name
to the notice of application. Other stakeholders as well have
emerged, including unsecured creditors and creditors claiming to
be victims of fraud. This case has generated a large number of
court appearances most of which have seen courtrooms overflowing with lawyers and interested parties. The distinction between
the “two hats” agency analysis applying to private receivers and
the broader, more all-encompassing multi-stakeholder analysis
appropriate to a court-appointed receiver is not mere theory.
 While the two types of receivership are quite distinct in
their foundation, there is in my view no material distinction to
be drawn between a privately appointed receiver and a court-appointed receiver for the purposes of s. 17 of the Mortgages Act.
I reach this conclusion for two reasons.
 First, the history and context of this legislative reform
suggests a very limited legislative intent that does not extend to
either of the two types of receiver.
 Saunders J. in O’Shanter found that s. 17 of the Mortgages
Act arose as a reform of the prior, somewhat harsher rule of
equity that required a defaulting debtor who “seeks equity [to] do
equity” by paying six months interest if seeking relief from a forfeiture. In O’Shanter, a subsequent mortgagee wanted to repay
the first mortgage (without payment of extra interest) after the
time to redeem under a power of sale notice had expired. It is
for this reason that equitable relief was required. The principle
underlying the original rule of equity and the milder statutory
rule that reformed it was said to be to provide the affected
secured creditor with time to seek a new investment.
 The reason relief from forfeiture was required in the first
place has to do with the nature of the title conferred by a mortgage