prepared by him”, the trial judge permitted him to testify about
anything that was contained in the reports, without exception.
 The trial judge’s attention was firmly on ensuring that
Dr. Smith did not offer any opinions beyond what was contained in
his reports (apart from the one discrete issue about treatment).
She did not focus on the opinions that were in the reports, and consider whether any or all of the contents of the reports exceeded the
scope of proper opinions to be offered by a participant expert.
 I am prepared to accept that it was appropriate for
Dr. Smith in his role as a participant expert to provide evidence
about Mr. Imeson’s mental condition, the treatment that he provided, Mr. Imeson’s response to treatment and the therapy he
would have recommended had Mr. Imeson not terminated treatment. As the trial judge recognized, such evidence goes to the
question of whether Mr. Imeson suffered harm. However, the fact
that Dr. Smith might properly have given evidence on those matters would not make his unredacted reports admissible, and allow
him to testify about everything that was contained in his reports.
 In the circumstances of this case, it was particularly
important to consider the nature of the various opinions proffered
by Dr. Smith in his reports and the purpose for which they were
being led before permitting Dr. Smith to testify as a participant
expert witness. As I have noted, Dr. Smith completed his reports
(except for the one dated February 17, 2015) approximately a year
after Mr. Imeson had discontinued his therapy. According to
Dr. Smith, he made thematic connections in the reports, which
were not present in his handwritten notes. At the time, he knew
that Mr. Imeson had commenced litigation. In these circumstances,
it is difficult to imagine why Mr. Imeson would have requested that
Dr. Smith prepare the reports other than for the purpose of litigation. In my view, these circumstances blurred Dr. Smith’s role.
 Applying Westerhof in the circumstances of this case,
Dr. Smith’s opinion evidence included evidence falling outside the
proper scope of evidence tendered by a participant expert.
 As Westerhof instructs, an opinion offered by a participant
expert must be given as part of the ordinary exercise of the witness’ skill, knowledge, training and experience. Here, any opinion
offered by Dr. Smith that sought to draw a causal link between
the alleged sexual assaults and Mr. Imeson’s later behaviour
could not have been based on his skill, knowledge, training and
experience while he was involved in Mr. Imeson’s treatment.
Rather, Dr. Smith testified that, in his therapeutic role, he accepted
Mr. Imeson’s statements that he had been abused as true, and he
confirmed that it was not his role to determine if the trauma
happened, but only to trust what he was being told.